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ABSTRACT 
With the United States and NATO mission coming to a close at the end of 2014, 
Afghanistan’s future is in doubt. China shares a border with Afghanistan, shares terrorism 
and security concerns with Afghanistan, and shares an interest in developing the 
resources of the country. 
In the scope of China’s foreign policy, its dealings with Afghanistan are not 
unique. Chinese state-owned enterprises hope to extract resources to fuel the Chinese 
economy. Beijing hopes to use its economic influence to stabilize the country as it waits 
for the security situation to improve. Afghanistan would benefit from Chinese investment 
and infrastructure development, but the role China will play in Afghanistan’s future is 
unclear.  
By looking at Chinese activity in Afghanistan, this thesis will show how Beijing’s 
actions have shaped development in Afghanistan and how it could shape its development 
in the future. The United States and China are both interested in stability in Afghanistan, 
but have pursued different policies to achieve stability. In the end, Chinese investment in 
Afghanistan could result in the emergence of the region either as a world economic 
player or as a continuously watched trouble spot.  
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The economic engine China has built over the last 30 years has lifted hundreds of 
millions of people out of poverty and made China into a world power. While there is no 
doubt about China’s economic clout, there are many who wonder how China will 
translate its vast wealth into geostrategic power. Afghanistan sits on China’s border and 
its future depends in large part on how China addresses its myriad problems. By studying 
how China has interacted with Afghanistan, this thesis dissects China’s policies toward 
Afghanistan, the implications of those policies, and how those policies interact with U.S. 
policy. 
A. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis explores China’s views on Afghanistan and the economic, security, 
diplomatic, and strategic motivations for its interests. China’s economic interests in 
Afghanistan involve investments in mineral and hydrocarbon deposits. To develop those 
deposits, Afghanistan needs significant investment in its transportation infrastructure, 
which hinges on the security situation in Afghanistan. Beijing worries about security in 
Afghanistan because stability there affects terrorism in China, the economic and political 
future of Central Asia, and equilibrium of the region. 
Stability in Afghanistan means different things to different countries. The 
American concept of a stable Afghanistan means a strong central democratic government 
that can provide services to the people and security for the country. This has devolved to 
a concept of a central government that can provide some services and will not allow 
terrorist organizations safe haven in Afghanistan. The Chinese concept of stability in 
Afghanistan differs slightly. China wants an Afghanistan that does not harbor ethnic 
Uighur terrorist organizations, does not attack Chinese nationals, and does not interfere 
with Chinese business and extractive industries. Both of these concepts of stability differ 
from the Afghan concept. Afghans want to be left alone by foreign powers and want the 
fighting to stop. After more than three decades of turmoil and war, Afghans just want to 
go about their lives. 
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After close examination of the security and economic interests of China in 
Afghanistan, this thesis will conclude with an exploration of the policy implications of 
Chinese interests in Afghanistan for the United States. This thesis recommends areas for 
possible cooperation between China and the United States, identifies areas where both 
powers disagree, and assesses areas where coordination is needed to prevent erosion of 
U.S.–China relations. 
B. HYPOTHESIS AND ARGUMENT 
The PRC has deep misgivings about the current and past U.S. and coalition 
approach to Afghanistan. As a neighboring country, China has taken a cautious approach 
to Afghanistan that emphasizes long-term stability and relationships that until recently 
have minimized China’s engagement in Afghanistan.  
Based on the information collected the following hypothesis is evident: China’s 
recent activity in Afghanistan represents a shift in China’s Afghanistan policy from 
minimum engagement to acceptance that stability in Afghanistan is essential because 
anarchy threatens China’s interests. 
China stands to be the overall winner in Afghanistan, according to some experts. 
It is estimated that $1 trillion worth of minerals lie beneath Afghan soil. As a result of the 
hybrid-capitalist Chinese economic model, China is favorably positioned to extract 
Afghanistan’s mineral wealth. How this came to be is a result of Chinese foreign policy, 
Chinese perspective, and China’s approach. 
“Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” guide Beijing’s approach to 
Afghanistan. The principles are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.1 Chinese foreign policy in Afghanistan shows  
 
 
                                                 
1 Andrew J. Nathan. “Principles of China’s Foreign Policy,” Asia for Educators, Columbia University, 
taken from Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search 
for Security. New York: W.W. Norton, 1997, accessed June 25, 2013. 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm. 
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the influence of these principles, discussed in detail in Chapter II. The five principles are 
not to be construed to be an altruistic approach to foreign policy; China’s interests in 
Afghanistan are real and enduring. 
As a neighboring country, Afghanistan presents China with the potential for a 
long, beneficial economic relationship, but the relationship is overshadowed by 30 years 
of crisis, war, and strife. China has an interest in the future of Afghanistan because of its 
proximity and economic potential in the long-term, but in the short-term the security 
situation in Afghanistan poses a threat to China. Instability in Afghanistan threatens 
China because of the connections between Afghanistan and the western Chinese territory 
of Xinjiang, populated by the predominately Muslim Uighur ethnic group. The People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) has made great efforts to subdue and integrate Xinjiang into 
China since the PRC was founded in 1949, but there is still deep Uighur resentment and 
resistance to the PRC. The Uighurs and the people of Afghanistan share the border 
between Xinjiang and Afghanistan, share the Muslim faith and some cultural traditions, 
and they share Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. At least one Uighur terrorist group 
is confirmed to have trained in Afghanistan prior to 9/11.2 
Security in Afghanistan not only affects Xinjiang but plays a role in the security 
and stability of Central Asia. Terrorist organizations in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan 
have intimate ties with Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations operating in 
Afghanistan.3 Central Asian governments are predominantly autocratic and have been 
susceptible to coups since independence in 1991. To counter this threat, the Central Asian 
States have partnered with Russia and China and adopted the principles of fighting the 
three evils (or “three-isms”) of separatism, extremism, and terrorism through their 
membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).4 China has made massive 
infrastructure developments in Xinjiang and across Central Asia for the purpose of 
                                                 
2 Phillip Potter. “Terrorism In China: Growing Threats with Global Implications,” Working Paper for 
Strategic Studies Quarterly, forthcoming 2013, 20–22. 
3 Renel R. Hanks. Global Security Watch: Central Asia. Santa Barbara, CA: Preager, 2010, 53–54. 
4 Stephen J. Blank. Central Asian Security Trends: Views from Europe and Central Asia. Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2011, 8–14; Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for 
Security. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, 86.  
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bringing Central Asia’s energy resources into China. Anarchy in Afghanistan threatens 
Central Asia, Xinjiang, and China’s energy security. The Chinese perspective in 
Afghanistan, therefore, must account for the short-term security needs of the region, and 
middle to long-term development goals in Afghanistan.  
The Chinese perspective on Afghanistan frames the government’s approach 
toward activities there. The most visible of those activities is the copper deposit 
concession Chinese companies won in 2007. This concession provides billions of dollars 
of investment into the mine at Mes Aynak and billions more in development of Afghan 
infrastructure to build the mine, power the mine, and transport the raw materials out of 
the country. This multi-billion dollar 30-year stake in the future of Afghanistan is 
matched with the 25-year stake in the development of Amu Darya oil field in northern 
Afghanistan. China’s long-term investment proves to the Afghan government and people 
that China is interested in the long-term success of the country, but it also limits what 
China can do in the short term.  
Chinese SOEs have made extensive investments in Central Asia over the last 10 
years and have begun to make significant investments in Afghanistan. The maturing of 
this investment has given the Chinese direct access to energy and mineral resources 
needed to continue economic growth. The products of resource extraction in Central Asia 
flow through the western region of Xinjiang. Because of Xinjiang’s strategic location 
connecting China to Central Asia, the PRC has used the carrot of economic development 
and the stick of suppression against the “three-isms” to pacify the region. This uneasy 
balance lies at the core of Chinese interests. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist 
Party and the PRC is tied to continued economic growth, stability, and the pursuit of 
territorial claims over territory “China” once “controlled.”  
China sees Afghanistan in transition but does not see who the apparent winner in 
the struggle for power will be. Unlike the Unites States, Russia, or Pakistan, China comes 
to Afghanistan without having prior conflict with past Afghan governments. This 
unblemished record makes it easy for Chinese diplomats and businessmen to approach 
Afghans and work out agreements. China’s reputation, however, could only be sullied 
unless Beijing is extremely careful with who and how it engages in Afghanistan. China 
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has hedged its strategy by conducting relations with the Taliban prior to 9/11 and has 
maintained relations through their ally, Pakistan. Because of China’s long-term interests 
in Afghanistan, this cautious approach will continue to be the norm for years to come.  
SOE investment occurs in this cautious context and as U.S. forces begin drawing 
down before the proposed departure at the end of 2014. Since the beginning of the war in 
Afghanistan in 2001, the PRC has minimized its presence, contributing only $197 
million, ranking twenty-third on the international donors list. From early 2012, however, 
Beijing has changed its activities and elevated the development of Afghanistan in 
anticipation of the coming U.S. forces departure. This suggests that Beijing recognizes 
that Afghanistan is a contributing factor to China’s future stability.5 
All speculation about economic development in Afghanistan is projected on the 
premise of a stable and secure Afghanistan. To counter instability and terrorism, Beijing 
has expended vast efforts in economically developing Xinjiang while it maintains a tight 
hold on authority there.6 The directed nature of the PRC’s economic development and 
security practices invites the question: How important is Xinjiang to the PRC? Terrorism 
in Xinjiang was spawned by the oppression-rebellion cycle and lives on in organizations 
like East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). How China deals with the ETIM and its 
restive Muslim population will determine how international jihadi terrorist networks 
respond to China’s rise on the world stage. Studies and articles about China’s other 
interests in Central Asia shed some light on the significance of Afghanistan and Xinjiang 
to China. The underlying issue in the discussion on security in Xinjiang and Afghanistan 
is energy security for China from the extracted resources of Central Asia. 
The implications of future stability in Afghanistan could mean future prosperity 
for Afghanistan, China, and Central and South Asia. Peace in Afghanistan allows China 
to build transportation networks that will further connect China to Central Asian energy 
resources and possibly to Iranian oil and gas. Security in Afghanistan allows Chinese 
                                                 
5 Erica Downs. “China Buys into Afghanistan.” SAIS Review 32, vol. 2: 70. 
6 Sui Xiufei and Yang Weihan. “Chinese President Gives Instructions for Development of Xinjiang 
Region.” Xinhua, June 2, 2011, trans. BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific–Political, BBC Worldwide 
Monitoring, Lexis Nexis, http://w3.nexis.com/new/docview/getDocForCuiReq?lni=530T-HMV1-JC8S-
C2KJ&csi=10962&oc=00240&perma=true. 
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companies to build mines and establish railways to provide the mineral feedstock for 
Chinese industry and to ferry China’s products to new markets. Afghanistan provides a 
strategic location for China to influence Central Asia's future and shape the balance of 
power among China, Russia, and the United States. Afghanistan’s location and resources 
could give it a bright future, but the future direction of Afghanistan under China’s 
patronage is unclear.  
An economically vibrant and stable Afghanistan, closely tied to China, could be 
an acceptable outcome to the United States. Stability in Afghanistan would be in China’s 
and the United States’ best interests and is the best-case scenario. Based on the current 
situation in Afghanistan, three situations would harm U.S. and Chinese interests in 
Afghanistan:7 the return of Taliban control of the government, further civil war or ethnic 
strife in the country, and Chinese investors sitting on the fence, having secured resource 
concessions.8 Future scenarios in Afghanistan provide fertile ground for speculation, but 
analysis of current interests of China in Afghanistan must form the basis of any 
speculation. Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Afghanistan comprise the largest 
investors in the country and the SOEs are committed to developing resources and 
infrastructure that could be a regulating factor in Afghanistan’s future.  
The current literature suggests that China will continue to be cautious in 
Afghanistan and unwilling to assert itself outside the diplomatic and economic sphere. 
This argument does not take into account the security vacuum that will exist in 
Afghanistan after the completion of the NATO mission. Anarchy in Central Asia could 
cause wild swings in China's rapidly expanding energy economy, and price spikes could 
sour domestic opinion and economic development faster than ethnic terrorism. With these 
threats to stability and sovereignty, China's interests may be threatened enough to 
provoke Beijing to insert itself into Afghan affairs through international organizations. In 
this scenario, Beijing could dispatch security forces to Afghanistan under a UN mandate 
and at the request of the Afghan nation.  
                                                 
7 Naveed Muktar. “Afghanistan: Alternate Futures and Their Implications.” Parameters vol. 41 
(Summer 2010), 62–75. 
8 Ibid. 
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C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II of this thesis focuses on defining China’s policy on Afghanistan in 
relation to China’s foreign policy. China’s international relations’ perspective will be 
used to explain China’s foreign policy with Afghanistan and the United States. Next, 
China’s multilateral relations with the SCO and its formation and actions are explored to 
show the variety of outlets China has to shape events in Afghanistan’s future.  
Chapter III focuses on security in China’s Xinjiang province and the overlap with 
Afghanistan. This section addresses the security relationships that China uses to deal with 
terrorism and how Afghanistan’s past and current roles have impacted those 
relationships. The terrorist group East Turkistan Islamic Movement is analyzed on its 
ability to conduct operations and how potential operations could affect Xinjiang and 
China.  
Following the security discussion, Chapter IV focuses on the Afghan economy 
and the economic relationship between China and Afghanistan. The details of the Mes 
Aynak and Amu Darya concessions are discussed, focusing on the controversy during the 
bidding processes and the factors preventing development. After elaborating the interests 
between the two countries, the rest of the chapter focuses on what drives those interests. 
The SOE projects at Mes Aynak and Amu Darya are analyzed for their implications to 
the future of Afghanistan and the role that China could play in it. Energy security is 
discussed in the context of connecting Afghanistan to China’s plan for energy security. 
Finally, this chapter will look at the strategic context of China’s actions in Afghanistan. 
The final chapter discusses the areas of mutual interest and conflict between 
China and the United States. This section lays out what prevents China from engaging 
further in Afghanistan and why China currently refuses military engagement. The 
conclusion recommends policies for the U.S. to pursue in engaging China on the future of 
Afghanistan. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As the literature in this field suggests, China’s interests in Afghanistan align with 
economic and security concerns. Sources assess the PRC’s actions in Afghanistan 
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through the mining concessions won by Chinese SOEs, the context of the Central Asian 
states, and the PRC’s security pressures in Xinjiang. The literature projects the role China 
can and may play in Afghanistan’s transition to full sovereignty leading up to 2014 and 
beyond. 
The state of scholarship on Chinese interests in Afghanistan is limited. Few 
studies have been done, and even careful scholars steeped in Chinese culture and 
language rely on interviews with Chinese officials for opinions representing the PRC. 
Journalists who focus on this issue are the few Central Asian English-language reporters 
who are fluent in multiple languages. Such journalists are limited because they must write 
for an audience that barely understands the geography of the area they are reporting on. 
Other journalists who stumble into this area are usually financial reporters who look at 
the story from an economic angle and miss or do not write about the larger 
considerations. With limited academic work and constrained journalism, China’s interests 
in Afghanistan is a prime target of further research. 
One approach of researchers addresses China’s role and interests in Afghanistan 
by analyzing high profile projects. While high-profile projects like the copper mine at 
Mes Aynak and oil and gas development of the Amu Darya concession have the potential 
for significant influence on Afghanistan, there has been little investigation of other 
aspects of the growing trade between China and Afghanistan. The linkage between the 
high-profile SOE projects and broader PRC policy is large. Some writers assume that 
SOEs are policy tools of the government and tie their action directly to national policy; 
others claim that SOEs are much more like Western corporations attempting to profit 
from their economic advantages and only tangentially reflect PRC policy. This perceived 
separation is unhelpful because China’s SOEs are diverse, politically connected 
institutions in China’s hybrid-capitalist economy. What is quantifiable are China’s 
diplomatic initiatives regarding economic cooperation and development in Afghanistan, 
which signals the increased importance the PRC places on the future of Afghanistan.  
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1. Literature by Chapter 
Two works have formed the framework of the characterization of China’s foreign 
policy for this thesis: Evan S. Medeiros’s China’s International Behavior: Activism, 
Opportunism, and Diversification and Andrew Scobell and Andrew Nathan’s China’s 
Search for Security.9 Medeiros’s perspective on China’s foreign policy emphasizes the 
priorities of maintaining sovereignty, promoting economic growth, and gaining prestige. 
He believes China acts as a defensive power that aims to control economic and security 
threats domestically and in the near periphery. Medeiros states that China has already 
integrated into the milieu of multilateral institutions and will continue to do so as long as 
it is in that country’s interests. Scobell and Nathan’s work characterizes China as a power 
that has increased in strength and capability, but still remains occupied with regional 
security issues. They believe that China’s international engagement is driven by the 
necessity to secure resources to fuel Chinese economic growth. While engaging with the 
international periphery, Scobell and Nathan believe that China engages the international 
community to decrease its vulnerability to its many perceived threats. What this thesis 
emphasizes is China’s economic foreign policy and how it relates to the periphery.  
The vehicle China has used to organize its foreign policy goals in Central Asia is 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Many authors have attempted to 
characterize the SCO as foil to NATO, but the evidence does not add up. Niklas 
Swanstrom in his work “China and Greater Central Asia: New Frontiers?” provided this 
work’s discussion of the importance of Central Asia to China. In it, Swanstom discusses 
the dimensions of security and economic cooperation in the SCO since its founding in 
2001. While initially formed as a security organization, Swanstrom believes that actions 
by Chinese SOEs and concerns about energy security have shaped how China has 
addressed these issues in Central Asia. Several authors seem to agree that the SCO has a 
larger role to play in the future of Afghanistan. Whether diplomatic, economic, or 
military, the SCO can provide impetus to influence the outcome in Afghanistan. Zhao 
                                                 
9 Evan S. Medieros. China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification. 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, Project Air Force, 2009; Andrew Scobell and Andrew Nathan, 
China’s Search for Security. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. 
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Huasheng states how China ardently opposes military action with or subordinate to 
NATO forces, but actions taken under the auspices of the SCO would be another matter. 
To date, the SCO has yet to embark upon creating a multinational military cooperation 
institution, but the literature clearly shows a future for the SCO navigating Afghanistan’s 
issues.10 
The purpose of Chapter III is to outline security issues that face China in Xinjiang 
and how those issues relate and are connected to Afghanistan. James Millward’s 
Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland extensively discusses the historical, cultural, 
economic, and security issues in Xinjiang. Millward’s characterization of the instability 
in Xinjiang stresses the historical roots of tensions there. Xinjiang is a frontier province 
that has more in common with its Central Asian neighbors than with the majority ethnic 
Hans in the rest of China. The actions of the authorities in Beijing to control the province 
have exacerbated the tensions and oppressed the ethnic Uighurs of Xinjiang. Millward 
highlights the causal relationship between the suppression of Uighurs, the formation of 
uprisings, and the eventual formation of terrorist groups. Millward tries to downplay the 
terrorist threat posed by ethnic Uighurs in his piece Violent Separatism in Xinjiang 
written in 2004. His argument for the lack of terrorist activity holds for the time period he 
wrote the work, but his 2009 article “Does the 2009 Urumchi Violence Mark a Turning 
Point?” ignores evidence of Uighur terrorist activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
Brian Fishman and Phillip Potter connect Uighur terrorist groups operating out of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan to Xinjiang in their pieces. Both papers describe the links 
between Al Qaeda and the Uighur terrorist groups. These links are not superficial and 
show how Uighur terrorist-separatist groups have embedded their cause in the framework 
of Al Qaeda’s global movement.11 
                                                 
10 Luftu Sagbansua and Nurettin Can. “Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Turkic Republics and 
Turkey: Economic and Business Dimensions.” Canadian Social Science, 7, no. 2, 80–87 (ProQuest 
873571336); Zhao Huasheng, China and Afghanistan: China’s Interests, Stances, and Perspectives. 
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012, 9–13; Richard Weitz. “The SCO’s 
Failure in Afghanistan.” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, accessed August 29, 2013, 
http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5494/print.  
11 Potter. “Terrorism in China”; Brian Fishman. “Al-Qaeda and the Rise of China: Jihadi Geopolitics 
in a Post-Hegemonic World.” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 3, 47–62. 
 11 
Chapter IV of this thesis will discuss the details of the economy of Afghanistan 
and Chinese SOE’s involvement in it. Erica Downs’s work, China Buys into Afghanistan, 
illustrates the Chinese approach to instability in Afghanistan. The Chinese National 
Petroleum Company (CNPC) and the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) won 
resource extraction rights in Afghanistan over the last decade. In order to win the 
extraction rights, the MCC and the CNPC paid large bonuses to the government of 
Afghanistan and promised infrastructure development worth approximately $10 billion. 
While the MCC and CNPC may be acting under the motivation of financial gain, the 
funds they are using to build the infrastructure projects are available because of PRC 
policies. Policy strategists believe this initial Chinese investment in Afghanistan will 
secure future access to the mineral wealth. Currently those investments may seem small 
when compared to the overall Chinese economy, but these investments establish 
relationships between the Afghan Ministry of Mines (MoM) and the government of 
Afghanistan that can later be exploited. These relationships potentially give China an 
advantage in future mineral resource extraction deals and also provide incentives to 
stabilize Afghanistan over the long term.12 
The PRC has spent the last two decades developing ties and resources in Central 
Asia. There are numerous articles about China’s energy extraction projects and pipeline 
projects in Central Asia.13 Energy security is a topic of great importance to the PRC and 
to the general population. Jun Joo-Youn conducted a randomized, telephone public 
opinion study in ten major Chinese cities on security perceptions in China and found that 
90 percent of respondents believed disruptions in China’s energy supply “will threaten 
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China’s national interests in the next decade.”14 As outlined in Corey S. Johnson’s 
master’s thesis, China is currently reliant on ocean tankers to receive the majority of its 
imported petroleum.15 Imported petroleum is a problem for the PRC because it does not 
have parity of naval power compared to the United States. Chinese analysts fear that the 
U.S. Navy could shut down imports of petroleum and starve the Chinese economy. 
Johnson argues the limited impact of the PRC’s attempt to rectify this with port and 
pipeline development projects in Burma and Pakistan. In the last two decades, Beijing 
has placed more effort in developing Central Asian pipelines to make China less 
susceptible to naval interference. Pipeline infrastructure now straddles Central Asia 
bringing petroleum and natural gas from productions sites, through Xinjiang into China. 
A stable Afghanistan and Xinjiang would mean secure access to this network and the 
opportunity to connect to production areas around the Caspian Sea and Iran. Several 
authors address how the future in Afghanistan could play a significant role in China’s 
strategic energy outlook.16 
Chapter V of this thesis deals with U.S. policy in Afghanistan pre- and post-2014, 
China’s policy and role in the future of Afghanistan, and areas where U.S. and Chinese 
policy diverge and overlap. Hu Shisheng wrote in the journal of the Chinese Institute for 
Contemporary International Relations that political reunification and reconstruction are 
possible in Afghanistan. “The four relevant parties of Washington, Kabul, Islamabad, and 
the Taliban share common interests in successful negotiations,” Hu stated, but he does 
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not hint at what China’s role in those negotiations might be.17 He does see a ripple effect 
from a future civil war affecting regimes in the region, but he is careful not to suggest 
what China’s role might be in a future conflict and places responsibility for Afghanistan’s 
future on the international community. Beijing believes in abstaining from meddling in 
the political affairs of another country, but it does see a role for the SCO to integrate 
Afghanistan into the security organizations in the region. Richard Weitz stated that the 
SCO has missed an opportunity to play a positive role in Afghanistan.18 The SCO has 
held summits on Afghan counterterrorism and counternarcotics concerns, but has yet to 
galvanize around a plan to plan to deal with the economic underdevelopment in 
Afghanistan. Hu Shisheng states that the PRC has relied upon Pakistan to deal with the 
Taliban and quell the activity of Uighur terrorist groups instead of addressing terrorism in 
Afghanistan through the SCO. China has a historical relationship of dealing directly with 
the Taliban and reportedly met with Mullah Omar prior to 9/11. In this way, China has 
hedged its security bets to suppress terrorist organizations no matter who comes back into 
power in Afghanistan.19 
Beijing’s response to President Obama’s realignment of Afghan policy and troop 
surge also illuminates how it shapes its policy toward Afghanistan. Kerry Dumbaugh of 
the Center for Naval Analysis spoke with military leaders and analysts in Beijing after the 
announcement of the surge.20 The officials were nonplussed about additional U.S. forces 
in Afghanistan and doubted their ability to make a significant difference in stabilizing the 
country. Dumbaugh mentions Beijing’s reluctance for ISAF forces to drawdown in 2014 
because PRC officials believe that a hasty exit of international forces from Afghanistan 
would hasten the downfall of the Afghan government. She goes on to state that Chinese 
                                                 
17 Hu Shisheng. “Afghan Reconstruction vs. Regional Challenges and Responsibilities.” Chinese 
Institute for Contemporary International Relations, accessed May 16, 2013, 
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policy toward Afghanistan before 2012 was one that neither directly aided the U.S. and 
coalition mission in Afghanistan, nor hindered it. The PRC’s cautious actions may be 
attributed to a longer term perspective: Beijing did not want to jeopardize future 
investments, agreements, or relationships if it did not have to. This lack of engagement in 
Afghanistan contrasts sharply with China’s long, deep relationship with Pakistan. 
Because the PRC views its alliance with Pakistan as separate, this thesis also will view 
the relationship between China and Afghanistan as separate. The similarity between the 
two relationships is that Beijing “continues to have a high tolerance for economic risk 
and a low tolerance for political risk.”21 
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II. FOREIGN POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
China’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan is not unique in the realm of China’s 
foreign relations. It fits into the overall framework of China’s approach to foreign policy 
by promoting stability through economic development. Beijing believes that foreign 
policy, economics, and stability are mutually reinforcing areas that support the nation’s 
interests. This chapter asks: What are the elements of China’s foreign policy in 
Afghanistan? This question is crucial to understand how Afghan foreign policy relates to 
China’s global foreign policy. By the conclusion of this chapter, it will be evident that 
China’s foreign policy in Afghanistan follows the pattern of China’s foreign policy 
toward developing nations. 
From the U.S. perspective, there cannot be economic development in Afghanistan 
until there is peace; from the Chinese perspective, there cannot peace until there is 
economic development.22 China has used the strategy of economic development to pacify 
restive areas for some time, but economic development as a part of diplomacy is a 
relatively new occurrence. 
Economic diplomacy serves the dual purpose of strengthening China’s foreign 
policy relationships and providing a market for Chinese goods while SOEs purchase 
resources for industry. Diplomatic support of economic activities includes opening 
markets for trade and investment while providing financial assets to native Chinese firms 
for economic development. Economic emphasis in Chinese foreign policy has emerged as 
a trend only in the last decade. The pattern follows a steady path: China opens 
relationships bilaterally, both parties sign a friendship accord, this is followed up with 
conciliatory trade agreements that normally benefit Beijing, potentially, there will be a 
free trade agreement, and finally Beijing will sign a “strategic partnership” with the 
foreign country. Beijing has placed special emphasis on luring partners with free trade 
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agreements since its acceptance into the World Trade Organization. Overseas direct 
investment through Chinese state-owned enterprises and state-controlled banks has 
become commonplace in developing countries. Loans for infrastructure projects and free 
trade agreements have given Chinese firms access to new markets and resources. 
Beijing’s previously modest foreign aid programs have been dramatically increased and 
reached $27.5 billion in 2006.23 
B. FUNDAMENTALS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 
When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) emerged victorious in the Chinese 
civil war in 1949, Beijing was isolated internationally and needed assistance. Mao’s 
decision to aid the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea against the United States 
further isolated Beijing. This experience of international isolation produced five 
principles that have guided Chinese foreign policy thinking: “mutual respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.”24 
The history of the PRC reflects the personal battles for power among elites and 
the chaos consolidation of power can bring. Mao Zedong’s battles for power began after 
the disastrous Great Leap Forward that began in the late 1950s and continued through the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that began in the mid–1960s. During this time of 
internal conflict, China participated only slightly on the world stage. At first, Mao aligned 
the PRC with the Soviet Union under Stalin, but after Stalin’s death Mao became 
increasingly frustrated with Soviet policy. This eventually led to the Sino-Soviet split that 
further isolated China. With few friends and no allies, Chinese foreign policy largely 
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Deng Xiaoping in 1978 solidified China’s return to the world stage. The five principles of 
peaceful coexistence were exercised during this period because China had no other 
options to exert its will on the world stage.25 
The twentieth century in China was marked by periods of instability and war, with 
little peace and prosperity. These tumultuous times allowed the Communist Party to 
consolidate its grip on China but also cause immense instability. When Deng Xiaoping 
changed China with economic reforms, he brought stability and wealth. Fear of 
instability, whether from internal disputes or from terrorist and separatist elements, 
became a dominant factor in China’s internal and external policy. 
Economic reforms ushered in a new era of relative peace and stability in China 
that has allowed the economy to grow exponentially, and for China’s influence to grow 
with it. Beijing was able to industrialize rapidly over the last 30 years by allowing foreign 
companies to invest in China. Foreign direct investment in China has produced 
astounding results that Communist China has been able to capitalize on. The process of 
economic development and rising foreign influence was highlighted by China’s 
acceptance to the World Trade Organization in 2001. Beijing has learned from its 
experience with foreign direct investment and has aimed to replicate it. Economic growth 
has brought prosperity and relative stability to China, and in turn that nation hopes to 
export prosperity and stability to neighboring countries. 
C. CHINA IN CENTRAL ASIA 
China uses the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the multilateral 
forum to promote issues in Central Asia. This forum allows China to put a multilateral 
spin on its predominantly bilateral efforts. Russia and China cooperate in the SCO as a 
means of playing regional powers like India, Iran, and the United States off each other, 
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organization defines the security threat in the region as the three evils of terrorism, 
separatism, and religious extremism.26 Security cooperation in fighting terrorism has 
been the organization’s biggest success. 
China’s new engagement with Central Asia began when the region split into 
independent republics after the fall of the Soviet Union. The relationship developed 
initially to settle border disputes but quickly evolved into deeper security ties to help 
quell separatist–terrorist groups in Xinjiang. Beijing’s campaign to “open up the west” 
predominantly focused on economic integration with Central Asia. Deepening security 
and economic ties have worked to prevent the separatist movement in Xinjiang from 
growing, even though it is popular with the citizens of Central Asia. The dual track of 
developing economic and security relationships is the major theme of the SCO.27 
The SCO was built as a forum to construct ties with Central Asian countries to 
fight terrorism, increase stability, and promote economic development. This began in 
1996 when China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan—the Shanghai Five—
joined to settle border disputes and enhance border security. In 1998, the forum began to 
focus on regional security and economic integration. The Shanghai Five had expressed 
concern about developments in Afghanistan through communiqués released in 1998 and 
1999. While the member states were affected by terrorism in Afghanistan, they were 
“neither qualified for, nor capable of, solving the Afghan issue on their own.”28 The 
attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan accelerated the creation of the 
SCO, according to Vladimir Putin. The forum became the SCO in 2001 and began to 
focus on fighting the three evils of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism.29 
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The pre–9/11 conflict in Afghanistan was viewed by the SCO as an internal 
conflict that needed a negotiated political solution, not a military invasion. This 
viewpoint aligns with the five principles of peaceful coexistence and shows the dominant 
position of Chinese thought and opinion in the organization.30 After 9/11, the SCO 
endorsed the United Nations as the organization that should play the leading role in 
reorganizing Afghanistan, but acknowledged that the international community would 
require external forces to complete the mission. The SCO parsed its position on military 
force in Afghanistan this way because the organization lacked the military capability to 
take on the mission itself, but did not want to see foreign nations establishing military 
presence in the region. Neither China nor Russia had the military capability or will to 
oppose the United States from interceding in Central Asia; possibly, they looked 
favorably upon U.S. involvement because each lacked the capabilities to fight the 
Taliban. U.S. military facilities and Kyrgyzstan, Manas Airbase, and other military 
facilities in the region have been a source of contention and competition for Russia. 
Russia has pressured Kyrgyzstan to cancel or not renew the lease for Manas. When the 
lease for Manas was extended in 2009, Russia extracted its revenge on the president of 
Kyrgyzstan by using its soft power to destabilize his regime. Opposition to U.S. military 
forces in Central Asia has allowed Russia to maintain its status as a dominant player in 
security matters in the region, while Beijing has emphasized counterterrorism and 
economic integration.31 
Russia has emphasized its security relationship with Central Asia through the 
formation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002, under the 
backdrop of rising terrorist threats in the region. Anti-terrorism exercises were held in 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the CSTO broadly supported crackdowns on dissent by 
local governments. The organization formed a rapid reaction force of 15,000 troops to 
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increase military integration, fight terrorism, and curb narcotics trafficking. The reaction 
force was not used to support the Kyrgyz regime in 2009 and received much criticism for 
its inaction. Russia has used CSTO to open two military bases in Kyrgyzstan and one in 
Tajikistan. While the functionality of these bases remains vague, they do promote the 
prestige of Russian military strength in the region. Central Asian states view the CSTO as 
a way to placate Russia’s interests while continuing to develop ties with China.32 
While Russia’s interests and prestige are being placated through the CSTO, China 
has deepened its efforts in Central Asia through trade and infrastructure development. To 
date, China has built pipelines, roads, rails, and hydroelectric power projects in many 
Central Asian countries. These initiatives serve to provide China with new trading 
partners and promote stability in the region, but more importantly, they provide access to 
resource extraction to fuel China’s economy. After Western companies secured lucrative 
energy extraction deals in Kazakhstan in the 1990s, China moved to diversify its energy 
sources in Central Asia.33 
The SCO has played an increasing role in the economic sphere in Central Asia. In 
2003, member states of the SCO signed a framework agreement to facilitate economic 
cooperation. At the same meeting, the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, announced the long-
term intention of turning the SCO into a free trade area and take short-term action 
through 100 projects to begin the process of economic integration. In the 2005 SCO 
meeting, Russia announced energy sector development projects along with agreements on 
the joint use of scarce water resources in Central Asia. These efforts were aided by the 
announcement of the SCO Interbank Association to fund development projects in Central 
Asia. Beijing has had success in promoting trade in the region: in 1992 trade between 
China and Central Asia equaled $459 million and by 2008 trade had reached more than 
$30 billion.34 Promotion of trade has allowed China to take advantage of Central Asia’s 
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vast hydrocarbon resources, which represents the largest proportion of the trade 
increases. Overall, economic cooperation has not been as successful as security 
cooperation in the SCO. This is mainly due to China’s sensitivity of respecting Russia’s 
traditional sphere of influence in Central Asia, but also reflects Russian efforts to prevent 
further economic agreements in the SCO.35 
Afghanistan became an observer in the SCO in 2012 and is looking to increase its 
economic and diplomatic ties with China. If Afghanistan were to become a full member 
of the SCO, Afghanistan would receive support and be expected to participate in 
counterterrorist operations. SCO countries have undertaken security exercises focusing 
on border security, which may protect them if the situation in Afghanistan worsens. 
Afghanistan may also benefit from SCO quick-reaction forces if the central government 
was in crisis. Most of all, the SCO offers Afghanistan a vehicle for engaging the Central 
Asian region for access to trade, aid, and military assistance as U.S. and NATO forces 
prepare to exit. The problem with the SCO is that its utility is limited by its members’ 
ability to come to a consensus, even on pressing issues like Afghanistan. Competition 
between China and Russia limit most actions accept for vague terrorist-related exercises. 
Disagreements between Central Asian states also prevent accord on issues. It is apparent 
that acting to stabilize Afghanistan is in SCO–member nations’ best interests, but 
divisions may continue to prevent action.36 
D. CHINA, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFGHANISTAN 
1. Pakistan–China 
China’s relationship with Pakistan has a long history that dates back to 1950 when 
Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize the PRC. The basis of cooperation 
between the two countries is their shared suspicion and antagonism toward India. More 
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recently, the relationship has expanded because of terrorist organizations operating in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan. 
These organizations are discussed in the next chapter. Terrorism and religious extremism 
are potent concerns of China because of security problems in China’s western province of 
Xinjiang.37 
China’s economic cooperation with Pakistan deals primarily with major 
infrastructure projects. The first major project built by China was the Karakorum 
Highway that connects the two countries. Chinese companies were involved in the 
construction and operations of the deep-sea port of Gwadar in western Pakistan. China is 
also building highway and rail links in Pakistan that will connect China’s interior to the 
sea, and give Chinese goods manufactured in central and western China access to the sea 
and global markets. Transportation infrastructure development parallels energy 
infrastructure development in Pakistan. Beijing has backed plans for the construction of a 
refinery in Gwadar and pipeline connecting Gwadar to Xinjiang. If built, the pipeline 
would provide China access to another route for petroleum resources to fuel China’s 
growing economy. China is heavily involved in building hydroelectric dams in Pakistan 
to alleviate energy shortages.38 
Defense cooperation between the Chinese and Pakistani armed forces has a long 
history. The Chinese defense industry has cooperated with Pakistan to build aircraft, 
tanks, and frigates. Joint exercises between the militaries of China and Pakistan are a 
staple of cooperative efforts. The relationship has such depth that China provided nuclear 
weapons assistance to Pakistan in the past and is currently working with Pakistan on the 
Chashma nuclear power plant. The deep, “all-weather” alliance between China and 
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Pakistan focuses on military matters in order to contain India and combat terrorism, and 
focuses economic cooperation to promote regional development and stability.39 
2. Pakistan–Afghanistan 
Afghanistan and Pakistan have historic colonial and ethnic conflicts that are still 
alive today. As a part of delineating the boundary between the British Empire and the 
Russian Empire, the Durand Line was drawn to separate Pakistan from Afghanistan in 
1893. This line cut through Pashtun and other ethnic minority lands, and is still disputed 
by the Afghan government. When Pakistan achieved independence in 1947, it continued 
the British policy of allowing the area along the Durand Line to be administered by local, 
tribal, and ethnic leaders only weakly affiliated with the central government.40 
The Afghan government has supported ethnic Pashtun claims on territory in 
Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province since 1947, and has been the primary source of 
poor relations with Pakistan. The Afghan government passed a resolution abrogating all 
diplomatic agreements between Afghanistan and British Indian government in 1950 and 
proceeded to deploy military forces along the Durand Line. This incident was followed 
by a civilian demonstration that attacked the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul in 1955, which 
occurred after Pakistan consolidated the territories in the disputed Pashtun areas of 
Pakistan. The relationship continued to ebb and flow with new leaders in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, but remained on the cusp of hostilities with the slightest provocation. The 
relationship reached another low point in the 1970s when both governments in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan tried to destabilize each other’s government by supporting 
dissident forces. Agreement on the Durand Line was almost reached in the late 1970s, but 
coups prevented the leaders from signing an agreement. Relations between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan improved during the Soviet invasion of the 1980s, but soured again when the 
Taliban refused to recognize the Durand Line. The current government in Kabul made its 
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intentions on the Durand Line known in 2003 when the government celebrated 
Pashtunistan Day and attacked the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul once more.41 
3. India 
China and India share a long and disputed border that triggered a brief war in 
1962. The conflict ended without an agreement delineating the border between India and 
China and has been a source of tension since. China’s close ties with Pakistan, and 
continuing support of Pakistani actions, have strained China and India’s relationship 
since the war in 1962. The relationship between the two countries is clouded by 
competition for regional superiority. India wants to be seen as an international great 
power, at least economically, on the same level as or superior to China. China officially 
states that India is a secondary security concern after Taiwan, but the sum of writings and 
comments on the issue point to deeper concern with the Indian security issue. At the most 
basic level, geography accounts for the tensions between the two countries. Because of 
India’s location, China and India compete for influence in neighboring countries and 
compete for some of the same resources to feed their economies. Trade between India 
and China has increased in the last decade, but little progress has been made in resolving 
the distrust and enmity that characterizes the relationship.42 
In Afghanistan, India has successfully developed a relationship on multiple levels. 
Indian government officials have been partnering with their counterparts in Kabul to help 
the government of Afghanistan. An Indian company won the rights to develop the 
Hajigak iron ore deposit in Afghanistan. India has also utilized its access to Afghanistan 
to further its own regional ambitions. India was involved in the construction of a deep-
water port in Chabahar located in eastern Iran. India was positioning itself to use 
Afghanistan as a conduit to access the resources of Central Asia. This effort seems to 
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have failed because of the deteriorating security conditions in southern Afghanistan. 
Intriguingly, India is rumored to have used its consulate in Kandahar and Jalalabad to 
fund anti-Pakistani government terrorist groups. India’s relations with Afghanistan are 
merely another area of competition between Indian, Pakistan, and China.43 
India, Pakistan, and Iran achieved observer status in the SCO in 2005. India and 
Pakistan’s bid to join the SCO hinges on deliberations over Iran’s bid to join the 
organization. As of the 2013 SCO meeting, all three nations have been rebuffed. The 
reason the SCO did not admit India and Pakistan is because of the ongoing hostilities 
between the two countries, and the fear that both countries would bring the organization 
into the conflict. This reason does not stand up to scrutiny because unlike other 
organizations, there are no clauses in the charter of the SCO to prevent it from meeting or 
passing agreements if one or both member countries are absent. In the event of another 
standoff between India and Pakistan, the SCO could continue function if one or both 
countries boycotted the proceedings. The benefits of membership to both countries would 
be substantial because both need better access to the energy resources of Central Asia. 
Membership in the SCO would further integrate India and Pakistan into the economies of 
the SCO and therefore increase the cost of conflict to both countries. Although India and 
Pakistan have a strong case to join the SCO as member states, their membership is tied to 
the accession of Iran. Iran’s bid to join the SCO is dependent on resolution of its nuclear 
program with the UN and Western powers.44 
E. IRAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
Iran has shifted its focus eastward toward China and Russia as a result of UN 
sanctions from its nuclear program. Russia and China have taken advantage of Iran’s 
economic position under sanctions by buying bargain-priced petroleum with consumer 
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goods. In this way, China and Russia are abiding by UN sanctions and economically 
benefiting from Iran’s weakened position. The policy of “looking east” may be changing 
with the ascension of the new Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, whose foreign policy 
has taken on a more conciliatory tone because of his intentions to end the standoff with 
the West over the nuclear issue. This development would allow Iran to continue its 
intention of becoming a member of the SCO while reaping the benefits of Western 
foreign direct investment if and when sanctions are lifted. Until sanctions are lifted, Iran 
must still find markets for its oil. In 2011, Iran ranked third in the countries exporting oil 
to China. Iran has also shown interest in building a pipeline to connect its oil and gas 
fields with the port of Gwadar. This could eventually lead to a pipeline that runs from 
fields in Iran to Shanghai. Iran plays a significant role in China’s energy security policy 
and can be expected to continue in that role in the future.45 
Oil imports from the Middle East, minus Iran, made up approximately one-third 
of China’s oil imports in 2011. China’s relationship with the Middle East is 
predominantly concerned with energy security. China does not possess forward deployed 
troops in the Middle East, like the United States does, nor does it concern itself with the 
internal matters of Middle Eastern countries. For this reason, China is dependent on the 
United States to secure the sea-lanes necessary to import the oil from the Middle East. 
China will have to evolve its relationship with its Middle Eastern importers as the United 
States becomes less dependent on Middle East oil and China becomes more dependent. 
China has dealt with this by becoming closer diplomatically with Saudi Arabia and 
importing more oil from the kingdom. While closer ties with Saudi Arabia have 
alleviated U.S. concerns about China’s relationship with Iran, China has misstepped in its 
policy in the region. During the Arab Spring, China’s position of supporting current 
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governments caused problems after those governments fell. China’s support of the new 
governments will allow relations to grow over time, but they do not bode well for China’s 
Middle East foreign policy. China is reluctant to engage Middle Eastern countries 
because it does not wish to become entangled in their conflicts, but increasing demand 
for Middle Eastern oil will make this position untenable in the future.46 
F. U.S.–CHINA RELATIONS 
The discussion of the foreign policy of China in relation to Afghanistan would not 
be complete without mention of the United States. As the world’s leading power, the 
United States has shaped a large part of China’s foreign policy. Beijing wants and needs 
cordial relations with the United States, but views the United States as a primary 
competitor and potential threat. China-U.S. relations in the last decade are relevant 
because they shape how China deals with Afghanistan. U.S. policy regarding China is 
addressed in a later chapter. 
China’s foreign policy toward the United States can be summarized as follows: 
“A core Chinese objective is to hinder the U.S. ability to constrain China; that is, it seeks 
to maximize its freedom of action and leverage as a means of countering perceived U.S. 
efforts to limit Chinese choices.”47 Globally, China seeks to engage the United States 
within the current world order to maximize current benefits. In Afghanistan, this 
objective has taken a different form. China has sought to engage Afghanistan 
economically while allowing the United States and NATO to deal with Afghan security 
issues. Some have termed this “free-riding” on the back of U.S. efforts, but this outcome 
is more of a result of China’s view of the United States.48 China was deeply concerned at 
the initial invasion of Afghanistan and immediately sent forces to the Chinese–Afghan 
border to monitor the situation. When the U.S. began to develop military bases in Central 
Asia to support the war in Afghanistan, this further worried Beijing. China has been 
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worried about “encirclement” in East Asia because of U.S. alliances with Japan, South 
Korea, the Philippines, and others. Having a U.S. military presence in Central Asia was a 
disturbing development for Beijing. Because of the U.S. and Western military monopoly 
of power in Afghanistan, Beijing has sought other ways to exert its influence. Economic 
activity in Afghanistan presented a viable, long-term engagement strategy for Beijing to 
counter U.S. military power. China is truly concerned about the security situation in 
Afghanistan, but has not found common ground with the United States to work together 
toward stability in Afghanistan because Beijing believes there is a better way to achieve 
security and eventual stability.  
Competition and distrust have prevented the United States and China from 
working together to find a solution for stability in Afghanistan. Relations between the 
United States and China took a downward turn in 2011 with the announcement of the 
U.S. pivot to the Pacific. The pivot reignited old fears of encirclement and containment of 
China. The pivot to the Pacific comforted U.S. allies but it also encouraged fears in 
Chinese policy circles. U.S.–China foreign policy maintained its rocky state in 2012 
when the United States made allegations of cyber espionage.49 In 2013 both countries 
began a rapprochement with a visit between President Obama and President Xi Jinping.50 
On par, China and the United States maintain a strong relationship that shows signs of 
strain. The common ground between the United States and China is that both countries 
have the goal of promoting stability in Afghanistan, but there are significant impediments 
to cooperation. 
G. CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN 
China’s multifaceted foreign policy adjusts to a country’s internal dynamics, 
resources, and goals. One must ask if China’s policy in Afghanistan is unique or does it 
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fit into the broader patterns of China’s foreign relations? The following will show that 
relations with Afghanistan are not unique and fit into China’s overall pattern of foreign 
policy.  
The 68th UN General Assembly opened on September 17, 2013, and various 
heads of state including President Obama addressed the General Assembly the week of 
September 23–27. Notably absent from this year’s events was Afghanistan’s President 
Karzai. President Karzai was in Beijing conducting a state visit hoping to deepen ties 
between China and Afghanistan. During his visit, President Karzai met with President Xi 
Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, praised China’s wisdom, and emphasized the 
importance of the relationship. The 2013 visit was President Karzai’s fifth trip to China. 
President Karzai’s absence at the UN could be a strategic move to symbolize unhappiness 
with the lack of an agreement between the United States and Afghanistan on the number 
of forces that will remain there after 2014. The move may also have an additional goal of 
trying to convince China to exert pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting Taliban forces. 
The most plausible reason for the timing of Karzai’s trip to Afghanistan is to highlight 
the importance of the growing economic relationship between China and Afghanistan.51 
Chinese firms have many dealings in Afghanistan and have the largest deal to 
date. In 2007, the Metallurgical Company of China won the concession to develop the 
Aynak copper mine in Logar province. This deal was worth $4.4 billion with the 
possibility of approximately $10 billion worth of infrastructure development; this deal 
will be discussed at length in Chapter IV.52 This deal allows Chinese companies and 
Beijing to exert tremendous influence in Kabul. China has the second largest economy in 
the world and borders Afghanistan; therefore, officials in Kabul believe that China is the 
key to Afghanistan’s economic future. The Aynak mine and additional development has 
the potential to provide 50,000 Afghans with jobs and generate hundreds of millions of 
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dollars a year in taxes to the government of Afghanistan.53 These funds will be crucial to 
the government because between 70 and 90 percent of the Afghan economy is currently 
based on the expenditures of ISAF forces in the area.54 This issue is such a priority that 
President Karzai himself spent a large part of his recent trip to China encouraging 
economic partnerships. Part of President Karzai’s trip was to court Chinese investors and 
convince them to invest in Afghanistan. Karzai also wanted to encourage Beijing to apply 
pressure to increase the pace of development of the Aynak copper mine. Future events 
will determine the success of Karzai’s visits, but there is ample proof of the growing 
importance of China’s influence in Afghanistan.55 
As evidence of the growing relationship, PRC Politburo member Zhou Yongkang 
visited Afghanistan in September 2012. This was the first visit of a high-ranking 
Politburo official since Liu Shaoqi visited in 1966.56 During his visit, Zhou highlighted 
the elevation of relations between Afghanistan and China to the level of the Strategic 
Partnership. He pledged that the PRC would “continue to encourage Chinese enterprises 
to invest in [Afghanistan], strengthen economic, trade, project contracting, resource 
development, agriculture, infrastructure construction and other fields [of] pragmatic 
cooperation.”57 President Karzai responded by ensuring the safety of Chinese nationals in 
Afghanistan. Economics was not the only thing on the agenda during this visit. Zhou also 
emphasized fighting “terrorism, drug trafficking, and transnational organized crime,” 
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along with the three evils represented by the ETIM terrorist group.58 By partnering as an 
observer in the SCO, Zhou said that Afghanistan could work to fight these forces. This 
visit began a new chapter in China–Afghan relations and highlights the economic and 
security areas where the two countries have mutual interests.  
Another small move that highlights the growing integration of China and 
Afghanistan: the PRC granted tariff exclusion on 95 percent of Afghanistan’s imports to 
China.59 This agreement will provide a bigger market for Afghan agricultural products 
and support the licit Afghan economy. This arrangement coincides with Afghanistan’s 
effort at accession to the World Trade Organization, which has been put on priority status 
by the organization. Accession would give Afghan goods access to a wide variety of 
markets, including China’s.60 
China’s influence in Kabul has grown as relations between the two countries have 
deepened. The trajectory of the relationship indicates that the two countries will continue 
to find common ground on economic and security issues. Economics and security have 
formed the basis of the relationship between China and Afghanistan and will be evaluated 
in subsequent chapters.  
China’s foreign policy approach promotes stability and antiterrorism cooperation 
to counter the threats of terrorism and separatism. Afghanistan shares a 70-kilometer 
border with China in the western province of Xinjiang. Ethnic Uighur elements in 
Xinjiang pose a stability threat in China because of active terrorist elements that wish to 
cleave a separate country from western China. This will be discussed in depth in the 
following chapter. Terrorist and separatist elements threaten China’s sovereignty and the 
legitimacy of the CCP’s grip on power. These groups have received shelter, aid, and 
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training in Afghanistan because of the lawlessness and instability there. An unstable 
Afghanistan will increase terrorist activity and will threaten Xinjiang and China. 
Beijing uses economic policy to fight the three evils of extremism, terrorism, and 
separatism and to promote social stability. Economic development has been used as a tool 
to fight social instability in Xinjiang for decades. Development policy brought wealth to 
Han migrants but has become a source for grievances for ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang. As 
politicians in Xinjiang are aware, economic development does not erase societal 
grievances against the state.61 In order to pacify Xinjiang, Beijing has embarked on a 
multifaceted strategy of suppression that has created a security state in Xinjiang. This 
environment has deterred terrorism but has created more grievances. In Afghanistan, 
Beijing would not be able to project a force capable of carrying out congruent operations 
as it did in Xinjiang for three reasons: (1) the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) does not 
have the capability to conduct long-term deployments;62 (2) China’s neighbors would 
consider an international deployment of PLA forces as a worrisome development; and (3) 
deployment to Afghanistan would violate the sovereignty of Afghanistan, go against the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and undermine China’s image as a benevolent 
power. In lieu of projecting a massive police force, Beijing uses economic enticements to 
lure potential allies into agreements that will hopefully support the current government 
and provide stability.63 
Stability may no longer be the defining principle of China’s foreign policy, but it 
will be a primary characteristic. Chinese domestic demand for natural resources has 
pushed Chinese industry further afield into Latin America, Africa, and Central and South 
Asia. These areas will provide the resources necessary to fuel China’s economy. The five 
principles of peaceful coexistence will be reinterpreted to allow China maximum freedom  
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of maneuver in each nation. Beijing has begun to take domestic affairs of other states into 
consideration in its foreign policy. Beijing supported the government in Sudan and 
heavily invested in the country until international groups threatened to label the Beijing 
Olympics the “Darfur Olympics.” After the international pressure and pressure from the 
United Nations mounted, Beijing was willing to intervene to help solve the humanitarian 
crisis in Darfur, Sudan. In the future, Beijing may be willing to meddle more directly in 
the domestic affairs of other states so that foreign governments will be stable enough to 
provide China with the resources it requires. To achieve resource security, China’s 
foreign policy strategy will continue to display the following objectives: “economic 
growth and development, reassurance, countering constraints, [and] resource 
diversification.”64 
Beijing has followed a pattern of economic diplomacy in Afghanistan. After 
normalizing relations in 2002, Beijing waited on the security situation to stabilize before 
taking any major steps. Beijing took small steps toward diplomatic engagement by 
inviting Afghanistan to the SCO summit meeting in 2005. Multilateral engagement with 
Afghanistan began in 2005 as China waited to develop an Afghanistan strategy. The 
Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) constitutes a 
multilateral effort to emphasize the development of the Afghan economy, and has met 
five times between 2005 and 2012. The number of participants has been as high as 70 
countries and has involved representatives from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
the Economic Cooperation Organization, the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation, the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program, and the Central 
and South Asia Transport and Trade Forum. The RECCA’s fifth meeting in Dushanbe in 
2012 prioritized the development of railways and highways connecting Afghanistan to its 
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regional electric power infrastructure under development. The RECCA has been a vehicle 
for regional integration, but China has been more focused on developing the Afghan 
economy bilaterally.65 
Beijing supported efforts to develop Afghanistan diplomatically by signing the 
Treaty of Good-Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation in June 2006. This general 
declaration mentions the mutual benefits of trade and economic integration, but more 
importantly it was signed as the Aynak copper tender was being developed.66 As stated 
earlier, the Aynak mine is the flagship investment of China in Afghanistan. This deal 
forced Beijing to reevaluate relations with Afghanistan and put Afghanistan on the 
economic diplomacy track. A Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed by President 
Karzai and President Hu Jintao in June 2012, and in October 2012, the PRC granted tariff 
exclusion on 95 percent of Afghanistan’s imports to China.67 This sequence of events 
follows the pattern China has used in its relations with many countries: China opens 
relationships bilaterally, both parties sign a friendship accord, this is followed up with 
conciliatory trade agreements that normally benefit Beijing, potentially, there will be a 
free trade agreement, and finally Beijing will sign a strategic partnership with the foreign 
country.  
Beijing has spent $58 million from 2002 to 2010 on soft power projects in 
Afghanistan. These projects included humanitarian aid, an irrigation project, the 
establishment of a Confucius Institute in Kabul, and a hospital construction and 
rebuilding project. While these projects have provided substantial improvement of 
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services in their targeted areas, China’s aid to Afghanistan is a pittance compared to 
international donations. From 2002 to 2010 the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development estimates that the international community donated $33.46 billion. 
When compared to the $800 million gratuity to the government of Afghanistan as part of 
the Aynak copper mine concession, China’s soft power efforts in Afghanistan are 
negligible.68 
China has not wed its Afghan foreign policy and economic future to the Karzai 
government. Before 9/11, China was in the process of normalizing relations with the 
Taliban and met with Mullah Omar. Through contacts with the Inter-Services Intelligence 
in Pakistan, China has maintained relations with the Taliban. China supports 
rapprochement and dialogue between the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan.69 
Even as China continues to garner a relationship with the Taliban, Beijing is not 
in favor of a Taliban-led central government. China has supported the sclerotic 
governments of autocrats in Central Asia for fear of the alternatives. If secular and 
corrupt Central Asian governments were to fall, more religiously oriented governments 
may take their place. More religious governments in Central Asia would likely see 
Beijing’s suppression of the Uighur minority as unjust and actively support terrorist 
elements inside Xinjiang. China hedges against this possibility by supporting secular, 
corrupt rulers in Central Asia and will likely do the same in Afghanistan.70 
H. CONCLUSION 
As the U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan shows, even tremendous military 
force cannot defeat a determined insurgency. China has learned this lesson and will be 
very wary to get involved in the internal affairs of any nation, not to merely adhere to the 
five principles, but to prevent ownership of an internal conflict in a foreign country. 
Beijing has engaged Afghanistan in the context of its general foreign policy. It does not 
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get involved militarily, but strives to engage and shore up current governments with 
economic development projects. As the following chapters will show, both security and 
economic development are key components to security.71 
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III. CHINA’S SECURITY CONCERNS AND AFGHANISTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
China has insulated itself from instability in Afghanistan, but the withdrawal of 
U.S. and NATO forces will place the future of Afghanistan in China’s hands. The 
triumvirate of ethnicity, religion, and statehood has shaped events inside Afghanistan and 
China. The tensions between the three have created terrorist and separatist elements that 
threaten the governments of Afghanistan and China. China’s goal is stability both 
internally in Xinjiang and externally in Afghanistan. To achieve stability in Xinjiang, 
China has expended tremendous resources on security and economic policy. Instability in 
Afghanistan threatens the stability in Xinjiang and Central Asia, but how Beijing opts to 
promote stability in Afghanistan is limited by China’s respect for sovereignty. This 
chapter will evaluate China’s internal security threats in Xinjiang and assess religious-
separatist terrorist groups and their ties with Afghanistan. Historical grievances with PRC 
policies of migration, clashes between ethnic Han and ethnic Uighurs, the drive for 
Uighur statehood, suppression of Uighur Muslim faith and culture, and the effects of life 
in a repressive environment have coalesced to form militant religious-separatist terrorists 
groups. These factors have coincided with the timing of world events to take Xinjiang 
into a nexus of dissent primed for the formation of terrorist groups.  
Beijing focuses its attention on terrorist activity because of the significance of 
Xinjiang in Beijing’s development plans. Xinjiang, Central Asia, and Afghanistan are 
linked by geography, ethnicity, religion, and history. Geopolitical competition for 
security in Central Asia is not new, but has changed character since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, creating strategic factors that motivate China’s interest in Afghanistan. Russia 
attempts to influence events in Central Asia through its military and security agreements. 
In the past decade, the United States has attempted to play a new role in the Central Asian 
region because of the war in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, China has developed influence in 
the Central Asian region by focusing its economic engine westward and in turn gaining 
political influence and securing resources. The most unstable area of Central Asia is 
Afghanistan, and its future will have strategic implications for the balance of power in 
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Central Asia. Since 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, China has emphasized its 
cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism in order to deal with threats to 
China’s domestic stability. The U.S. war in Afghanistan allowed Chinese state-owned 
enterprises to invest in Afghanistan’s mineral wealth and develop a stake in its 
transportation infrastructure. Beijing’s investment goal in Afghanistan is stability, and 
China has aimed to achieve that goal by enhancing the economy and security of 
Afghanistan. If Afghanistan were to become unstable, it would threaten Chinese 
investments in Central Asia and, more importantly, domestic stability in China. 
Stability in Afghanistan is crucial to China’s regional development strategy. 
Peace and stability in Afghanistan allow China to build transportation networks that 
would connect it to Iranian oil and other Central Asian energy resources. It would also 
allow SOEs to build mines and establish railways to provide the mineral feedstock for 
Chinese industry and to ferry China’s products to new markets. Afghanistan provides a 
strategic location for China to influence Central Asia's future and shape the balance of 
power between China, Russia, and the United States. Afghanistan’s location and 
resources could give it a bright future, but the future direction of Afghanistan under 
Beijing’s patronage is unclear.  
The stability of China is threatened by tensions and turmoil in the western region 
of Xinjiang. Terrorist elements in Xinjiang have found safe haven in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan in the last twenty years. Stability in Xinjiang is threatened by religious-separatist 
terrorist operations. Since Xinjiang connects China to Central Asia geographically, it is 
crucial to China’s regional development strategy. Stability in Xinjiang is threatened by 
the ethnic Uighurs who have historical grievances with the majority ethnic Han Chinese 
of the People’s Republic of China. The PRC has dealt with Xinjiang by combating the 
three evils or “three-isms” of religious extremism, terrorism, and separatism. This policy 
has led to militarization and religious repression in Xinjiang. The PRC has used the carrot 
of economic development and the stick of suppression against the “three-isms” to pacify 
the region. The legitimacy of the Chinese state is tied to continued economic growth, 
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stability, and maintaining control of its territory. Terrorist, separatist, and religious 
extremist elements in Xinjiang threaten the state’s control on power.72 
B. TERRORISM IN CHINA 
Beijing typically conflates political opposition and terrorism; individuals willing 
to express views different from those of the sole power of the Chinese Communist Party 
have been routinely persecuted. In the case of religious-separatist terrorist groups in 
Xinjiang, political opposition has resorted to violence to achieve their goals. Western-
style terrorist groups have emerged from Xinjiang for a variety of reasons. Western 
terrorism experts generally agree on the following definition of terrorism: premeditated 
politically motivated violence, perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national 
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.73 
By Western definitions, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and other 
groups have resorted to terrorism because of increasingly repressive and successful 
campaigns against rebellious elements in the western province of Xinjiang. The ETIM 
traces its beginnings to a Soviet-backed group in 1940. Over time, the group has changed 
opinions, tactics, and members, but has relied on violent clashes with authorities to 
communicate its message. The group surfaced in the 1980s and began gathering 
followers for a coordinated action that succeed in taking over a township in 1990. This 
incident became known as the Barren Rebellion. Hasan Mashum participated in the 
Barren Rebellion and was imprisoned multiple times in the 1990s. After his last release, 
he went abroad to secure funding and re-formed ETIM in the late 1990s. Mashum met 
with Osama Bin Laden and moved the ETIM’s headquarters to Afghanistan in 1998. 
There, he established training centers for terrorists. Mashum was killed in a joint U.S.-
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Pakistani raid in 2003 but the ETIM found a new leader and continued operations. The 
ETIM is not the only terrorist organization in China but is the highest profile group.74 
The world focuses on the ETIM as the primary terrorist group threatening 
Xinjiang and China, but the ETIM played a small role in terrorist activity prior to 9/11. 
China’s role in the war on terrorism after the 9/11 attacks was to root out and crush its 
domestic terrorist elements in Xinjiang. Chinese reports attributed hundreds of attacks 
and deaths to Uighur terrorist groups in Xinjiang, and requested that the United States 
place the ETIM on the nation’s black lists.75 When the United States elevated the ETIM 
to its black list, it elevated the profile of terrorism in China to the international stage. The 
meteoric rise of ETIM and terrorism in China raises many questions: Who are the 
Uighurs? Why are they opposed to the central government in China? Why have the 
resorted to terrorism? The Chinese government censors its media reporting and Xinjiang 
has the tightest state control of information and daily life. State control applies to foreign 
journalists as well. In order to travel in Xinjiang, which has only been possible in the last 
twenty years, foreigners must apply for permits and then be escorted by handlers and 
followed by the intelligence apparatus. This leaves scholars and policymakers with an 
incomplete picture of what is happening in Xinjiang and allows the Chinese government 
freedom of action.76 
Terrorism in China is a symptom of the repression of the Uighur ethnic minority 
by the Chinese government. Without a means for discourse with the government, the 
Uighur ethnic minority cannot address their ethnic, cultural, religious, and political 
grievances with the state. Repression of terrorist activity has created a security state in 
Xinjiang. Under constant pressure, terrorist groups from Xinjiang fled China to 
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Afghanistan and Pakistan. The security state in Xinjiang exacerbated the grievances of 
the ethnic Uighurs, guaranteed the future rise of terrorist elements, and will continue to 
pose a threat to the government of China.  
1. Why Is the State So Concerned with Resistance in Xinjiang? 
The Chinese Communist Party controls the system of government in China—
there are no opposition parties. In China, one-party-rule seeks to perpetuate itself and has 
“infinite political will” to do so.77 Currently, “the perception of stability, [and] the 
projection of the image of the Party as the great protector of the Chinese nation, is the 
sole good the Party is producing for society.”78 Stability and prosperity are tenuous in 
China and terrorism and separatism in Xinjiang threaten the legitimacy of the government 
by threatening the goods the government provides.  
2. Who Are the Uighurs? Evolution of an Ethnic Identity 
The identity of the Uighur ethnicity is a construction loosely based on the history 
of the people of the region. Many powers have conquered the geographic area of 
Xinjiang over the centuries: Turkic peoples, Mongols, Russians, and Persians, to name a 
few. The geography of the region consists of mountain ranges and the high, arid 
Taklimakan and Gobi Deserts that are bordered by oases.79 The Han Dynasty began 
fighting for and controlling part of Xinjiang in approximately 57 BCE. This is the historic 
date that the PRC uses to justify its claim to Xinjiang. In 744 BCE, the Uighurs began 
conquering Mongolia and the area now known as Xinjiang. Their dynasty lasted until 840 
BCE when they were conquered. The remnants of the empire settled near modern 
Urumchi and Turfan, where they enjoyed successful relations with Chinese dynasties 
until they were crushed by the Mongols in the 14th century. The people of Xinjiang have 
fallen under the rule of the PRC, the USSR, and the Qing Dynasty in the 20th century. 
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Xinjiang, or the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, was created in 1949 by the PRC 
and represents many ethnicities with various claims that loosely relate to history, religion, 
and geography. The term Xinjiang translates to “new frontier,” and was adopted as the 
name for the region in the late 19th century. The Uighur national story traces its claim for 
independence to the Communist independence from 1945–49 and the nationalist 
independence from 1932–34.80 
C. UIGHUR GRIEVANCES, COUNTERTERRORISM, AND BEIJING’S 
ATTEMPTS TO STABILIZE XINJIANG: FOUNDATIONS OF 
SOCIETAL WARFARE 
Uighur grievances with the PRC stem from policies that prevent a Uighur nation-
state and appear aimed at the destruction of Uighur culture through policies of migration 
and homogenization. Uighur separatist groups strive for an independent nation based on 
the periods of independence in the 20th century. The drive for independence increased 
when the Central Asian republics became independent countries in 1991. Historical 
grievances can be a powerful motivating factor in the formation of terrorist groups, but 
they alone do not account for the rise of terrorism in Xinjiang. Historical grievances on 
PRC policies of migration, clashes between ethnic Han and ethnic Uighurs, the drive for 
Uighur statehood, suppression of Uighur Muslim faith and culture, and the effects of life 
in a repressive environment have coalesced to form militant religious-separatist terrorists 
groups.  
Uighur grievances with the PRC go back much further than the last two decades. 
PRC policies in Xinjiang go back to the founding of the PRC in 1949. Shortly after the 
PRC came to power in 1949, it began a resettlement campaign in Xinjiang. The Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) was formed out of demobilized army units to 
serve as a backstop against rebellion, a basis for development of infrastructure, a model 
for developing loyal Communist cooperatives, and a bulwark against further Soviet 
influence. Migration to Xinjiang has produced startling results. In 1954 there were 
200,000 members in the XPCC; as of 2000, there were 2.48 million members of the 
XPCC, which translates to approximately ten million ethnic Hans living in Xinjiang. The 
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campaign to Open Up the West, revealed in 1999, was a continuation of a campaign of 
Western development begun in 1992, and has been part of the PRC’s strategy for ruling 
Xinjiang since 1949. Migration has accompanied infrastructure projects that include 
water reclamation, transportation projects, and most importantly a west-to-east gas 
pipeline to bring energy from the Central Asian states into China.81 
Martin Wayne believes that in the last 20 years the PRC engaged in “society-
centric warfare” to counter resistance in Xinjiang.82 This strategy combines the efforts of 
the army, police, and security apparatus who engage Uighurs at the lowest level of 
society and enforce rules on reporting on their friends and kin, collectively penalizing 
families and villages when individuals conduct seditious activity. Wayne gives examples 
of how work groups, villages, street committees, neighbors, and heads of families were 
coerced to cooperate with authorities. In the early 2000s, the deployment of 150,000 
People’s Liberation Army soldiers combined with the People’s Armed Police and 
intelligence personnel proved successful in containing any event that occurred. This force 
prevented unknown numbers of incidents and rooted out any elements that might be 
planning an attack. Constant pressure has prevented groups from forming and individuals 
from coordinating. Repression has a price and the PRC has imprisoned and killed many 
who have been guilty by the slightest association.83 
Society-centric warfare included a cultural campaign to curtail all aspects of 
ethnic Uighur life. The Uighur language was banned from use at Xinjiang University, but 
parents of school-age children could still choose to send their children to Uighur- or 
Mandarin-speaking schools. At school, children were banned from wearing traditional 
Muslim dress. At work, Uighur men were not allowed to have beards or facial hair, and 
were not allowed to publicly practice their Islamic faith if they wished to hold a 
government job.84 Religious practices were strictly curtailed in Xinjiang in order to fight 
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what Beijing labeled as extremism. Youth under the age of 18 were not permitted to 
worship in mosques. Imams were not permitted to discuss religious matters in small 
groups at residences or cafés. These practices show the extent the representatives of 
Beijing were willing to go to prevent any means of religious resistance in Xinjiang; the 
price of religious repression was increased ethnic tensions. Religious practices were 
strictly curtailed in Xinjiang in order to fight what Beijing labeled as extremism. During 
this time, a male teenage group movement began as a way to teach Uighur culture and the 
Muslim faith. These groups were eventually banned and prevented from organizing a 
soccer tournament. Government officials went so far as to confiscate all soccer goals in 
the city and occupy the main soccer field with a company of tanks. While it is unclear 
how much of a threat teenagers playing soccer pose to the central government, it does 
show the extent of effort the representatives of Beijing are willing to go to prevent any 
means of resistance in Xinjiang.85 
Bombings, assassinations, and riots in the 1990s showed Beijing that there was 
growing momentum for a separatist movement in Xinjiang. Local party officials were 
unable to stop the tide of resistance from growing. Uighur nationalists had usurped the 
Chinese Communist Party’s control of local governing organizations, while mosques and 
religious groups were allowing resistance members to organize. The events of 9/11 
provided a pretext for Beijing to replace officials at all levels, dramatically increase 
military and police presence in Xinjiang, and create a police state where every action was 
believed to be monitored by secret police. This counterinsurgency strategy was successful 
by all accounts until the riots in 2009.86 
The repressive counterinsurgency strategies in Xinjiang make no distinction 
between political activities and terrorism:  
The PRC does not recognize such distinctions; its rhetoric and policy 
routinely conflate terrorism with separatism and separatism with dissent. 
They also fail to distinguish extremism from religious belief. Chinese  
 
                                                 
85Millward, Violent Separatism in Xinjiang, 17. 
86 Wayne, China’s War on Terrorism, 81–87, 98–99.  
 45 
government officials refer to "the three evils" of terrorism, separatism, and 
extremism in Xinjiang, thus linking the three concepts rhetorically and 
working to elide the distinction between terrorism and nonviolent 
dissent.87 
The tendency to confuse the Western definition of terrorism with political activity 
suits the Chinese government. It allows them to color any political action as terrorism and 
gives them the freedom of maneuver to enforce increasing levels of intrusion on ethnic 
Uighur life. 
While conducting religious suppression, Communist party officials began 
replacing local leaders. Upwardly ambitious ethnic Uighurs replaced local Communist 
party leaders and local bureaucrats. Uighurs were brought into People’s Armed Police 
units and intelligence units to provide cultural understanding to government enforcement. 
This Uighur face on Beijing’s activities did little to quell the frustration of the Uighurs. 
Opposition groups have accused Beijing of adopting and promoting a Han migration 
campaign that has resulted in Uighurs becoming a minority in their own homeland.88 
This accusation resonated deeply when the one-child policy was extended to the Uighur 
ethnic group. Societal warfare through homogenization practices and restrictions on 
religious worship have created deep antipathy in the Uighur ethnic minority. Even when 
Beijing has created programs to economically help Uighurs, such as the a program aimed 
at temporarily migrating western China’s population eastward for better jobs, they were 
seen as a conspiracy to prevent Uighur women from marrying and raising families. These 
efforts were magnified by massive influx of infrastructure development in Xinjiang.89 
The PRC used economic development as a tool of pacification for Uighurs in 
Xinjiang. Xinjiang contains 30 percent of China’s domestic oil reserves and 
geographically connects China to vast energy deposits of Central Asia.90 The Westward 
Development program brought highways connecting the area, pipelines for the transport 
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of oil produced in Xinjiang, and a corridor for energy and trade with Central Asia. 
China’s state-controlled investment banks and corporations have expended large amounts 
of time, money, and effort to bring in oil, gas, and trade to China from Central Asia. The 
population of Xinjiang does not currently justify the need for massive highways, but their 
presence facilitates military reaction times in case of an outbreak of violence. More 
money in the province has raised the standard of living in the area, but it is believed that 
the wealth has been unevenly distributed. This belief has furthered the idea that economic 
development is just another tool of suppression by the Chinese state.91 
The rise of terrorism in Xinjiang since 1990 can be attributed to multiple 
reinforcing factors. One factor was that historical narratives made the Uighur ethnic 
minority proud of past glories. A second factor was the grievances from the repressive 
policies of the Communist Party contributed the motivation for individuals to become 
religious-separatist terrorists. Another factor was that the allocation of funds for 
economic development favored Han Chinese at the expense of Uighurs. These factors 
fueled religious and ethnic tensions but were magnified by the timing of world events. 
The fall of the Soviet Union and the independence of neighboring Central Asian states 
increased hope and nationalism in Xinjiang in the early 1990s. The final factor was the 
Tiananmen Square crisis in 1989, which made some Uighur groups believe that the 
Chinese Communist Party was losing its grip on power. This time period of perceived 
opportunity coincided with the return to Uighur mujahedeen who had recently returned 
from fighting in Afghanistan against the Soviets. This situation created an environment 
ripe with capability, opportunity, and animosity for terrorism to fester. Grievances, 
timing, and opportunity combined to fuel the formation of religious-separatist terrorist 
networks. 
Terrorism in Xinjiang arose from cultural grievances of the ethnic Uighurs but 
also reflect the persecution of a minority Muslim population by the secular Chinese state. 
While these grievances have not gone unnoticed in the Muslim world, they have not brought 
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about a call for jihad against the Chinese state. In essence, China has been able to fly under 
the radar of U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Repression of Uighur Muslims will garner 
more attention as China’s international prestige increases. 
D. THE ETIM’S ACTIVITIES AND CONNECTIONS 
While many terrorist groups and umbrella organizations claim the Uighur ethnic 
minority, the ETIM is the only group internationally recognized and blacklisted. The 
ETIM’s nationalist goal was to establish the state of East Turkistan and to ultimately 
create the Caliphate in accordance with their fundamentalist Islamic beliefs. One of the 
group’s main tenets was the “divinely ordained duty” of jihad but their focus was on 
China instead of the West.92 The group condones violence for the purpose of achieving 
their goals and their language is highly suggestive of their Al Qaeda links. The group’s 
focus on China was justified because they believed that China was the near enemy that 
must be defeated before the West.93 
The relative calm of the early 2000s eroded in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics. Tensions in the government were so high that ethnic Uighurs were not allowed to 
buy hotel rooms in Beijing during the Olympics.94 Attacks varied but were unsuccessful at 
disrupting the Olympic games: in April, a woman on a plane headed for Beijing attempted to 
start a fire; in May, bus fires in Shanghai were claimed by the ETIM; and in August, a 
grenade and knife attack on police officers occurred in Kashgar. ETIM threatened more 
attacks on the Olympics, which did not occur but raised their profile internationally and 
highlighted their cause of Uighur nationalism.95 
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The 2009 riots in Urumchi were blamed on terrorist elements, but this was more 
likely a case of popular uprising being cast as terrorism in order to justify the police state 
in Xinjiang. The riots began after a series of exaggerations and rumors circulated that 
were based on hearsay and rooted in ethnic tensions. The story starts at a factory in 
eastern China. There, a group of Uighur laborers were attacked after a rumored sexual 
assault of a Han Chinese woman. Uighurs died in the incident, but the official news 
covering the event lacked credibility because of state censorship. Because of the 
censorship, both the Han and Uighur population in Xinjiang did not believe the figures 
posted by Chinese state media. This incident prompted a small demonstration by Uighurs 
in Urumchi a week later. Military riot police were quickly brought in and suppressed the 
demonstration. News of the violent suppression of the initial demonstration sparked 
impromptu demonstrations by Uighurs across the city that led to another round of violent 
suppression by military police. Officially, 197 people died as a result of the violence. 
There are unconfirmed stories of piles of dead Uighur demonstrators being burned in the 
city, so the figure given by the state media is doubted as well. The 2009 riots symbolize 
the mischaracterization of political activism in Xinjiang as terrorism.96 
The 2009 riots cannot satisfactorily be labeled “terrorism” and the incidents 
leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics hardly disrupted the event. One conclusion from 
these events is that the ETIM is an ineffectual terrorist group. From this view, the PRC’s 
counterterrorism policy of societal warfare against the three evils has been successful in 
preventing terrorist attacks. Another conclusion is that the ETIM and other groups lack 
the capability to effectively organize and carry out attacks in China. A third possible 
conclusion is that the ETIM, or its successor [East] Turkistan Islamic Party ([E]TIP), are 
paper tigers that Beijing uses to justify its repression in Xinjiang. What appears likely 
from the evidence is that the ETIM has moved its operations to the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and they are continuing to plan future 
attacks. 
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Phillip Potter makes the case that the ETIM has become a major player in the Al 
Qaeda network. Adul HaqTurkistani was the leader of ETIM from 2003 until he was 
killed in a U.S. drone strike in Waziristan in 2010. He had risen to become the leader of 
Al Qaeda forces in FATA and the Shura Majilis (executive council). When he was killed, 
Abdul Shakoor Turkistani took his place until his rumored death by U.S. drone strike in 
2012. Potter makes the further deduction that if the leaders of ETIM are intimately 
involved in the leadership with Al Qaeda, then they will have greater access to training, 
funding, and supplies to grow ETIM into a larger terrorist threat in China. A Pakistani 
news report details a video released in 2013 showing children training to fight for the 
ETIM, or as they are now known [E]TIP. This video indicates that terrorist actions in 
Xinjiang have been curtailed but future attacks are likely.97 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Uighurs of Xinjiang have a separate cultural identity and story from the 
predominant ethnic Han in China. In order to subdue the population, integrate it into 
China, and develop Xinjiang economically, Beijing has engaged in harsh tactics that have 
been largely successful in stamping out resistance. Continued suppression of Uighur 
culture and religion has come at a price. The group formerly known as ETIM has definite 
and deep links to Al Qaeda and the insurgency in Afghanistan. Chinese suppression of 
ethnic Uighurs will raise the profile of the PRC’s harsh treatment of its Muslim citizens. 
The terrorist threat from Xinjiang is likely to increase because of continued repression 
and lack of political means to protest grievances. 
It will become increasingly difficult for Beijing to pursue repression as a means of 
dealing with Xinjiang. The rise of Sina Weibo (Chinese twitter) and other social networks 
and micro blogs are preventing the government from having complete control of 
information coming out of Xinjiang. The loosening of control will create a media market 
ripe for terrorists to exploit. If the ETIM were to shift tactics and attack less secure 
targets in Eastern and central China, then they could find a large audience for their 
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actions. It is likely that China will be forced either to accept more terrorism domestically, 
continue to increase the repression in Xinjiang, or improve efforts to co-opt Uighur 
nationalism into Chinese nationalism.98 
Regardless of domestic actions, China’s exposure to international terrorism is 
growing. China is working closely with the Middle Eastern and African governments that 
jihadists have dedicated themselves to overthrowing. Extractive industries in Libya, for 
example, put Chinese nationals at risk.99 China’s relationships and rising profile will 
eventually make it a target for international jihadist groups. There is little doubt that 
terrorism will shape China’s domestic and international foreign policy in the decades to 
come. 
Terrorism will remain a main preoccupation of the Chinese state because it 
threatens the legitimacy of PRC and CCP system. If Afghanistan is allowed to descend 
into anarchy, it could become a source for unrest in Xinjiang and China. Beijing is 
intimately aware of this and has hedged its bets: Beijing has continued to develop its 
relationship with the Taliban even as it continues to support the current regime in Kabul. 
The future stability and security of Afghanistan will dictate events in Central Asia and in 
Xinjiang. 
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IV. THE AFGHAN ECONOMY AND CHINA’S INTERESTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The theme of diplomatic relations between Kabul and Beijing has centered on the 
deals between Chinese SOEs and the development of Afghan resources; the Aynak 
copper mine and the Amu Darya oil field concessions present the public face of China’s 
activity in Afghanistan. These highly visible multi-billion dollar projects prominently 
figure into the media’s discourse on China’s role in Afghanistan and the significance of 
its involvement. As the largest projects to date in Afghanistan, this chapter discusses the 
content, motivations, and implications of the Mes Aynak and Amu Darya projects. Each 
project is a case study of the interplay of state-owned enterprises, the Chinese 
government, and the Afghan government. By analyzing these projects, this chapter 
illuminates the patterns and motivations in the relationship between the two countries and 
parses out possible motivations and policies that drive them. The chapter then turns to a 
discussion of how Afghanistan fits into the regional economic development program 
from which Beijing appears to be operating. Economic relationships among Afghanistan, 
Central Asia, Pakistan, and Iran present opportunities for growth in market share for 
Chinese companies, but more importantly, they offer a window into how China views 
energy security and economic development on its periphery. As stated before, Beijing 
believes that economic development presents a win-win situation for China and foreign 
countries, and allows China to positively influence stability on the periphery. By 
exploring future projects and their significance we can define the possible policy stance 
of the People’s Republic of China on Afghanistan. 
Generally, Asia-Pacific countries are wary of China’s growing military power but 
are eager to encourage more trade with China. This circumstance has created a reliance 
on U.S. security relationships and economic integration with China. Beijing is keen to 
develop military assets that can be used to defend its territory but refrains from massive 
military expenditures in order to focus on domestic growth. Beijing has tried to ease 
neighboring countries’ fears by signing strategic partnership and trade agreements that tie 
them to the Chinese economy and portray military activity as part of China’s “peaceful 
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rise.” Increased trade between China and its neighbors has not drawn countries into 
China’s sphere of influence. Key economic partners like Japan, South Korea, and 
Australia have security alliances with the United States while they are deepening trade 
with China. This allows China’s influence to grow in the region and offset influence lost 
to the United States. In this way, Beijing’s foreign policy maximizes economic 
relationships and influence while keeping security issues at a relative status quo.  
Beijing’s emphasis on economic foreign policy allows SOEs to take the lead 
while the government supports their actions. Outwardly, Beijing invests in foreign 
nations to provide win-win scenarios that benefit China and the target country. 
Investments grant access to markets and develop influence in foreign countries without 
meddling in the affairs of other nations. This soft approach relies on China’s state-owned 
enterprises to make investments supported, financed, and backed by the power of the 
state. By allowing state-owned enterprises to take the lead, China’s foreign policy follows 
state-owned industries into countries and then supports their activities. This is the general 
shape of affairs in Afghanistan. 
B. SECTION I: THE AFGHAN ECONOMY 
Lack of modernization in Afghanistan is attributed to structural and cultural 
factors unique to the country. As an economic, cultural, and geographical crossroads, 
Afghanistan has been influenced by successive waves of conquerors and empires. The 
past is evident in the wide range of languages still used in Afghanistan to include Persian, 
Pashtu, Dari, and Urdu, to name a few. The country’s ethnic and tribal groups distrust 
outsiders, but intermix on the periphery while they maintain separate identities. The 
economy supports a wide array of agricultural and animal products grown by subsistence 
farmers who trade for what they need in bazaars in the cities and villages. Even rural 
population centers have cottage industries that produce goods for those in the 
countryside. Nomads and caravans still dot the landscape and farmers must migrate from 
higher and lower altitudes throughout the year to earn their living. This rustic existence 
has been able to produce the goods necessary for survival for centuries and has operated 
independently from central governments. Geography also plays a role in preserving 
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traditional ways of life. High mountains and deep valleys have isolated enclaves of 
people and allowed them to continue their traditions.100 
Afghanistan suffers from a long history of dependence on foreign aid. Prior to 
British influence in the region, the Afghan economy was supported with plunder from 
raids into the Indian subcontinent. After the British incursions into Afghanistan in the 
19th century, the Afghan government received subsides from British controlled India to 
act as a buffer state between the British Empire and czarist Russia. High-level Soviet aid 
from the 1950s through the 1980s produced modest infrastructure improvements but did 
not modernize or industrialize the Afghan economy. More importantly, aid has been 
primarily used to buy influence and loyalty of local tribal leaders, not to develop the 
country. High levels of foreign aid have created a situation where the people have 
become unaccustomed to supporting the national government or expecting much from 
it.101 
Since 2001, the overall performance of the Afghan economy and the 
government’s control of inflation seem commendable. The Afghan economy has grown 
at a rate of about 9 percent annually since 2001 and has managed to avoid even moderate 
inflation. These positive economic indicators are only skin deep. The high level of aid 
dependency and security-related spending has propped up the Afghan economy, but it is 
not representative of growth in the overall economy. Other indicators of future economic 
performance are more worrisome. There has been little progress in rule of law, 
government effectiveness, control of corruption, and political stability when compared to 
other post-conflict countries. These factors promote uncertainty on the viability and 
future of the Afghan economy after the NATO transition in 2014.102 
NATO presence in Afghanistan has grossly distorted the Afghan economy. The 
World Bank estimated 97 percent of the Afghan economy is related to or a direct result of 
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foreign military presence.103Aid to the government and security-related aid amounted to 
47.5 percent of gross domestic product in Afghanistan in 2011. If aid to the government 
were to fall precipitously it could drastically affect the government budget and lead to 
instability if security forces are not paid.104 The Tokyo Donors conference in 2012 
resulted in $16 billion pledged by the international community to assist Afghan 
government with the transition, but it is unclear how much of the pledged funds will 
materialize. The conference highlighted how $1 billion out of every $8 billion donated to 
the Afghan government was unaccounted for and lost to corruption. Although the loss 
through corruption is disconcerting, the illicit Afghan economy has robbed the licit 
economy of its potential for growth and sustainability. Opium production has distorted 
economic development and exacerbated the growth of good governance practices. Illicit 
narcotics and arms trafficking are estimated to have reached $12 billion of illegal trade 
annually. While illicit activity eats away at government legitimacy, licit infrastructure 
and mining projects are not slated to come online until 2016–17. With NATO forces 
leaving and large extraction projects not coming online in the immediate future, the 
Afghan government is placed in a position of continued reliance on the international 
community until other revenues are generated.105 
1. Corruption 
Understanding how corruption affects the Afghan economy shows how Chinese 
SOEs can use the corrupt system to their advantage. Chinese companies are no strangers 
to corruption, but by comparison, China ranks 80th and Afghanistan ranks last on 
Transparency International’s annual corruption index. Transparency International placed 
Afghanistan in a three-way-tie for most corrupt country in the world, tied with Somalia 
and North Korea, according to their 2012 corruption index.106 By Transparency 
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International’s definition, corruption is the “abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain.”107 Corruption has two expressions, paying a bribe for preferential treatment or 
paying a bribe for an official to break the rules. Lack of rules, institutional weakness, 
little respect for the rule of law, lack of oversight, meager incomes for public officials, 
and little fear of getting caught or suffering consequences all play a role in fostering 
corruption in Afghanistan. When the large sums of money associated with international 
aid and the impending withdrawal of NATO forces are added to the mix, it is easy to see 
how corruption flourishes. It is important to remember that international aid did not cause 
corruption in Afghanistan, it only exacerbated it. Corruption follows the historical pattern 
of patronage in Afghanistan: the central government buys the allegiance of local leaders 
in order to consolidate power.108 
Rampant corruption in Afghanistan has detrimental effects on the economy and 
the government because corruption accounts for 30–50 percent of the Afghan 
economy.109 Chinese interests should be concerned about corruption in Afghanistan since 
corruption erodes confidence in the central government. Corruption hampers public 
works and infrastructure projects, which further erodes the confidence of the people in 
the government. Beijing is not wed to the government in Kabul, but needs it in order to 
proceed with development and to prevent Afghanistan from slipping back into a breeding 
ground of international terrorist activity located on China’s border. Grand-scale 
corruption may have enabled the Metallurgical Company of China along with the Jangxi 
Copper Company to secure the bid for Aynak, but continuing endemic corruption will 
hurt China’s long-term interests in Afghanistan.110 
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2. Mining and the USGS Report 
One of the success stories of the U.S. war in Afghanistan is the completion of the 
United State Geodetic Survey (USGS) of Afghanistan in 2007. Soviet-era surveys turned 
up at the Afghan Ministry of Mines in 2004. These surveys were reportedly kept safe 
during the Taliban period by Afghan geologists. Based off these findings, the USGS and 
British counterparts conducted aerial and ground surveys of Afghan minerals. This data 
has been input into modern three-dimensional mapping software and has generated 
popular and commercial interest.111 
Task Force Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) was a DoD project that 
began in 2006 as a way to promote “economic stabilization in order to reduce violence, 
enhance stability, and restore economic normalcy in areas where unrest and insurgency 
have created a synchronous downward spiral of economic hardship and violence.”112 
TFBSO released the 2007 USGS report in 2010 and estimated that there were $1 trillion 
of minerals waiting to be extracted in Afghanistan. James Risen of the New York Times 
published an article about the report that highlighted Afghanistan’s vast “previously 
unknown” mineral wealth and quoted the then CENTCOM commander, General 
Petraeus, who called the find “hugely significant.”113 TFBSO, whose mission was to 
bring private investment into Afghanistan, had its funding cut in 2011 as a result of a 
disagreement in Congress over whether the DoD should promote private development in 
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Afghanistan. This cut in TFBSO’s funding is a prime example of how the United States 
has prioritized stability through security, not through economic development.114 
3. An Afghan Resource Curse? 
A country with a resource curse is defined by the presence of abundant natural 
resources with poor gross domestic product growth.115 Afghanistan has an abundance of 
natural resources, but may not be subject to a resource curse. The Afghan economy could 
be used as tool to bring prosperity and stability to the country, as a tool to subdue the 
Pashtun people, or as a tool to empower and entrench the current government. As the 
USGS study points out, Afghanistan has tremendous potential for development of 
extractive industries. The history of developing countries with abundant natural resources 
contains many instances of continued civil war and instability. Cindy Hurst of the U.S. 
Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office envisions a future in Afghanistan where terrorist 
elements control the mineral wealth of Afghanistan and use it to fund their operations.116 
While this may have been the case in Sierra Leone, this does not have to be the outcome 
in Afghanistan. The World Bank was aware of the potential for economic development to 
sputter and began working with the government to promote best practices immediately 
after the initial 2001 invasion. Even though Afghanistan has abundant mineral resources, 
the resource curse has not necessarily been a curse in most circumstances. The Fraser 
Institute conducted a study and found that in two out of three countries, resource booms 
were more likely than resource curses. While corruption and weak institutions have the 
potential for fueling a resource curse, a Taliban funded by resource extraction is unlikely 
because of the lack of infrastructure in Afghanistan and the presence of other sources of 
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funding for the Taliban.117 Despite the fragility of the Afghan government, insecurity, 
and the lack of infrastructure, private investment will continue to be drawn to 
Afghanistan because of the vast quantities of untapped mineral wealth.118 
4. Why Chinese Businesses are Interested in Afghanistan 
China has a rapidly growing diverse economy with wide-ranging interests and 
requirements. Because of China’s export-led growth, China has a large stockpile of 
foreign reserve currency that it has used to fund projects through state-backed 
development banks. These banks allow China’s SOEs easy access to capital to fund large 
projects. When the Afghan government opened the Aynak copper deposits for bid, the 
Metallurgical Company of China (MCC) along with the Jangxi Copper Company (JCC) 
were able to access financial assets that enabled them to outbid all other competitors. As 
Erica Downs points out in her paper “China Buys into Afghanistan,” MCC and JCC’s 
successful bid was not the result of an explicit policy of involvement in Afghanistan 
orchestrated by the PRC, but more the result of structural factors.119 The policy of 
China’s state-owned banks was to grant loans at favorable terms to companies securing 
resources in foreign countries. MCC and JCC were looking to diversify their holdings, 
and the MCC already had experience in the Sandiak copper/gold mine in Pakistan. In this 
case, MCC and JCC led the way for China’s involvement in Afghanistan.120 
China is not the only country or multilateral institution focused on developing 
Afghanistan’s mineral wealth. The World Bank had been involved in developing the 
Aynak deposit since it issued a report on mining prospects in Afghanistan in 2002. Many 
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international institutions attempted to donate funds and implement best practices in 
developing Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, but the Minister of Mines (MoM) Mohammad 
Adel took control and corrupted the process to ensure that the Aynak tender was awarded 
to MCC. Multilateral institutions have had successes and failures in attempting to 
encourage development in Afghanistan, but international organizations have played other 
roles as well.121 
China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) were deeply concerned 
about the illicit aspects of the Afghan economy. The SCO held a special conference on 
Afghanistan in March 2009 that focused on stemming the flow of narcotics and terrorism 
from Afghanistan.122 The spread of opium from Afghanistan to neighboring countries in 
the region was a significant concern. It was estimated that opium production represented 
49 percent of the Afghan economy in 2004, but has dropped to 15 percent as of 2011.123 
This is due to a combination of eradication efforts and promotion of other crops, but also 
because of the growth of the licit Afghan economy. Poppy cultivation presents a large 
hurdle to the future development of the Afghan economy because it provides funding to 
criminal and terrorist organizations, distorts the market for agricultural products, and 
fuels corruption of public officials in the country.124 
5. Section Conclusion 
This section has described the intricacies of the Afghan economy along with the 
potential windfalls of mineral and hydrocarbon extraction, and the potential downfalls of 
corruption and the resource curse. Chinese businesses are genuinely interested in 
Afghanistan because of its vast mineral resources, and the Chinese government facilitates 
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investments to secure those resources. The following section will provide an in-depth 
analysis on the Aynak and Amu Darya concessions. 
C. SECTION II: RESOURCES IN AFGHANISTAN 
The mineral wealth of Afghanistan is estimated to be worth $1–3 trillion when 
extracted. Taxes and royalties from mining companies could provide income for the 
Afghan government and tens of thousands of jobs for Afghans. The most significant 
deposits of minerals are the copper deposits at Mes Aynak and the iron deposits of 
Hajigak. Mining is not a new business in Afghanistan. Lapis and emeralds have been 
mined in Afghanistan for centuries and mining operations have continued through war 
and peace, because the mines are small and worked by groups of prospectors. 
Afghanistan also has world-class deposits of rare-earth elements, including lithium, 
which could make it a world player in that market. Even though Afghanistan’s 
hydrocarbon resources are smaller than some of its Central Asian neighbors, Afghanistan 
has enough hydrocarbon resources to be energy independent for a long period. An 
American geologist, Bonita Chamberlin, worked on surveys of Afghanistan’s geology in 
the 1970s and wrote a book about them in 1995. In total, she identified 91 minerals at 
1,407 locations. The biggest problem that is preventing the development Afghanistan’s 
mineral wealth is the lack of transportation infrastructure to move the materials to 
market.125 
D. THE MES AYNAK COPPER MINE 
The Aynak copper tender is located in Logar province, approximately 25 miles 
from Kabul. The site is in a high, arid desert lacking transportation infrastructure access. 
The area receives snowfall because its altitude ranges from 7,300–8,500 feet, but remains 
accessible throughout the year. The most recent occupant of note, Osama Bin Laden, 
established an Al Qaeda training camp on the land that was destroyed in a 2002 
airstrike.126 The 240 million tons of ore present at the site is of world-class caliber, at  
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2.4 percent concentration, and could produce six million tons of pure copper that could be 
worth over $100 billion when extracted.127 The Aynak copper project needed significant 
transportation infrastructure development in order to be viable. The potential impact of 
infrastructure development associated with the Aynak tender persuaded President Karzai 
to call Aynak “one of the most important economic projects in Afghan history.”128 Other 
projects in Afghanistan have the potential to have a significant impact on the future of the 
country. The Amu Darya oil field concession, while small, was won by the China 
National Petroleum Company in 2011 and has already produced oil. The Hajigak iron ore 
deposit tender was won by and Indian consortium and infrastructure development related 
to the project is completed. The TFBSO report in 2010 called Afghanistan the future 
“Saudi Arabia of Lithium,” the rare-earth element used primarily in batteries for a wide 
variety of modern technology.129 Any of the deposits described would make Afghanistan 
a noteworthy player in the world market for that commodity, but combined they make 
Afghanistan an attractive future source of resources. 
This section discusses in detail the development of the concessions won by 
Chinese SOEs at Aynak and Amu Darya. At both sites, the bidding process for the 
tenders was surrounded by controversy and allegations of corruption. Since the 
concession was awarded, both sites have had success and failures due to local politics and 
security concerns. Different factors have postponed the development of the sites but both 
present the potential for mineral extraction in Afghanistan. 
Before the Mes Aynak copper tender could be put out for bid, the Afghan 
government had to create a regulatory bureaucracy and laws to support the mining sector. 
The Minerals Law of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was drafted and partially 
enacted in December 2005. The legislation officially created the Afghan Ministry of  
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Mines and a general framework of regulatory and licensure procedures. As of 2013, the 
specifics of royalties and obligations of investors are still being debated after another 
minerals law was passed in 2009.130 
The World Bank had been working with the Government of Afghanistan on 
developing Aynak and minerals legislation since 2002. A different international 
organization fought the World Bank framework while funding the bidding process, which 
resulted in the requirement of hiring of a company to oversee the bidding process for 
Aynak. The company hired as the consultant to the Afghan Ministry of Mines, or 
transaction advisor, was a firm from Boulder, Colorado. This firm was woefully 
unprepared to conduct the tender bidding process. The result was that the Afghan 
minister of mines, Mohammad Adel, was able to appropriate the process and assert his 
preferences. The minister went so far as to personally collect the expressions of interest 
from companies, locking them in a safe in his office. This arbitrarily limited the number 
and size of firms allowed to compete for the tender. The minister further manipulated the 
process when he handpicked the committee that would award the tender. The committee 
selected nine companies to enter the final round of selection and four withdrew their bids. 
Even though commercial experts were available to help evaluate the expressions of 
interest, Adel did not allow them to participate in the process. Evaluation of the final bids 
proceeded along the same lines with the minister of mines monopolizing and strong-
arming the proceedings to fit his desires. The Metallurgical Company of China (MCC), 
44 percent owned by the government of China, had the financial resources to make the 
most attractive bid but also had the unwavering support of the Afghan Minister of Mines, 
Mohammad Adel.131 
A summary of the bids for the Aynak project is shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.  Comparative Table of Bidding Companies for AYNAK Copper Mine,  
from Afghan Ministry of Mines.132  
Key components of the bids were the amount of time to start production, the 
royalty rate, infrastructure included in the bid, and the bonus paid to the Afghan 
government. What is not evident from this table is the amount of infrastructure 
development promised in the MCC bid. The actual bid has not been made public, but 
from discussions about the project, the following infrastructure developments are 
believed to be attached to the MCC bid: 
• 400 Megawatt thermal, coal fired power plant 
• A coal mine developed to feed the power plant 
• A water supply for the mine 
• Locally sourced minerals for smelting copper 
• A rail line connecting Pakistan to Kabul and an additional rail line from 
Kabul to Tajikistan that connects to China 
• Area development to include roads, homes, schools, and hospitals 
• Technical training in mining at Kabul University for Afghans133 
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In total, the infrastructure attached to the project could cost upwards of $10 
billion.134 Because of the scope and depth of the investment that this bid represents for 
Afghanistan, it is easy to see how this bid can be viewed as strategically linking China 
and Afghanistan rather than a commercial mining bid. It is also easy to comprehend how 
bidders in this process viewed their competition as unfair since private firms competed 
against the resources of the Chinese state. 
As Alexander Bernard points out, the trend toward public–private partnerships in 
mining deals is not a new phenomenon. China has been using this strategy in Africa, 
South America, and Central Asia to secure deals for Chinese firms. He goes on to 
describe how the Chinese have been the most successful at this tactic but even European 
states routinely mix diplomacy and business interests. The Aynak deal represents part of 
a larger trend in the mining industry to public–private partnerships, but also toward 
developing resources in remote parts of the world that require infrastructure for 
development. Bernard also infers that that President Bush declined an opportunity offered 
by President Karzai to tilt the bidding process in the United States’ favor. If President 
Karzai could influence the outcome, there should have been no surprise at the award of 
the Aynak bidding process to the MCC.135 
Aynak has a troubled history and faces many obstacles to development. The start 
date for mining at Aynak was originally planned for 2012. Estimates on the mine’s start 
date now ranges between 2015 and 2017. Reasons for the delay on the start of operations 
range from the practical to the theoretical. The obvious reason for delay of the project is 
the deteriorating security situation in Logar province. In 2007, when the project was 
rumored awarded to MCC, tribal leaders from Logar province went to Kabul to protest 
the tender and they stated that they could not “guarantee the security for the workers of 
the company.”136 This foreshadowed the problems the workers at Aynak would face. 
There are 1,500 guards around the Aynak facility from the Afghan National Police that 
are directly paid by the MCC. Even with this protection force, Aynak was attacked 19 
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times in 2012–13. A Chinese reporter visited Aynak in 2010 and heard heroic stories of 
Afghan defenders fighting off assaults by Taliban forces. As of December 2012, the 
majority of workers had returned to Aynak to continue the necessary assessments and 
planning for mining to begin operations. Security of the facility is a priority for work to 
resume and begin operations by the end of the decade.137 
The Taliban forces prevented some of the development of the Aynak site, but the 
historical significance of artifacts and structures found on the site have played an 
important role in delaying development. The finds at the site include fourth- to eighth-
century Buddhist monasteries, and more importantly to archeologists, and the cities that 
supported those facilities. Manuscripts from the Hellenistic age of Alexander the Great 
have been found at the site as well. The site sits along the ancient Silk Road and is so rich 
with potential archeological finds that some have called Aynak a “potential Pompeii” of 
Central Asia.138 The archeology of Mes Aynak was first made public in 1963, but MCC 
claims to have been unaware of the discovery. In order to save what artifacts they can, 
salvage archeologists have taken frescoes and any other portable artifacts in order to 
preserve them. It is assumed that the open-pit mine will destroy the relics at the site or the 
shock waves from blasting will destroy what is left in the ground. Archeology of the site 
may have legitimately stalled development of the site, but may have also provided a 
convenient excuse for MCC to stall the contract.139 
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With the continued attacks on the site, it is likely that locals or Taliban-related 
elements want bribes to secure the area around the mine in Logar province. Doubts raised 
of the viability of the project with ISAF forces withdrawing at the end of 2014 could 
contribute to the project’s slow progress. Other potential explanations are that MCC may 
be focusing its efforts on problems with its Papua New Guinea mine or its project in 
Australia. Since there are many reasons for MCC to be concerned about their investment 
it is understandable that they are taking a cautious approach to the project. With so many 
uncertainties, MCC may also be reconsidering the cost of the infrastructure promises of 
the initial bid.140 
Because the Aynak project is the premier minerals and foreign direct investment 
project in Afghanistan, President Karzai believes that the project is directly tied to the 
future of Afghanistan. This puts Afghanistan in a deleterious negotiating position. It is 
not uncommon for Chinese SOEs to try to renegotiate deals after they have been signed 
because it places host nations in a poor bargaining position. Afghanistan cannot afford to 
revoke or lose the Aynak bid, especially when it still has not finalized its Minerals Law. 
If Afghanistan were to try to revoke the contract before the withdrawal of ISAF forces, it 
is unlikely that they would receive bids anywhere near comparable to the bids presented 
in the first offering. There would be significant effects on private foreign direct 
investment in Afghanistan if it were to revoke the deal as well. In this case, Afghanistan 
will likely be forced to renegotiate the deal, but the international community may be able 
to invoke enough pressure on Beijing to prevent significant alteration of the 
agreement.141 
The government of Afghanistan and the Afghan Ministry of Mines learned 
lessons from the Aynak bidding process. The controversy around the awarding of the 
Mes Aynak concession reached a conclusion when the former Afghan Minister of Mines 
Mohammad Adel was accused of accepting a $30 million bribe. He was replaced without 
going to trial and the new minister has taken steps to increase transparency at the 
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Ministry of Mines. The Global Witness Report on the Mes Aynak project listed ten areas 
where the Ministry of Mines could improve the process. The ministry responded to the 
report and it seems that the agency is moving toward the best practices that the World 
Bank attempted to establish at the onset.142 
E. THE AMU DARYA OIL FIELD 
The Amu Darya oil field project is the second piece of economic evidence of 
China’s interests in Afghanistan. The Amu Darya concession has been much more 
successful and less controversial than the Aynak concession. The concession was 
awarded in 2011 and a year later the project was bringing oil out of the ground. This 
concession shares some of the same characteristics as Mes Aynak: the bidding process 
was controversial and was awarded to a Chinese company, the project appears more of a 
foreign-policy aid program than a commercial venture, Beijing’s diplomatic 
representatives have played a role in securing the contract, and the project has been 
plagued by setbacks, including lack of infrastructure and insecurity. The Amu Darya 
bidding process also marks a stark contrast in the improvement of the bidding process 
under the leadership of the Minister of Mines, Wahidullah Shahrani. The project has 
proceeded to the point of extraction of resources, but has stalled because of a blend of 
issues that highlight the interconnectedness of Afghanistan and China with Central Asia.  
Afghanistan’s hydrocarbon endowments were first found in the 1930s with major 
exploration commencing in 1956 and deposit development started by the Soviets in 1959. 
The USGS survey estimated that Afghanistan holds 1.6 billion barrels of crude oil and 16 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The Amu Darya deposit holds 80–90 million barrels of 
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oil with potentially significant amounts of natural gas. The basin is part of a larger field 
that stretches into Turkmenistan and has vast proven gas reserves.143 
After a failed bidding process in 2009, the U.S. Department of State 
commissioned analysis from TFBSO. The bidding process for Amu Darya proceeded 
from TFBSO’s analysis in 2009 and TFBSO became intimately involved in getting the 
process off the ground. TFBSO funded a project to restart a Soviet-developed oil field to 
prove the viability of one of the three blocks of the Amu Darya tender. By December 
2010 TFBSO had worked with the Ministry of Mines to initiate the tender process with a 
team of experts. The process was dictated by the 2009 Afghan Hydrocarbons Law and 
subsequent Hydrocarbons Regulations. The tender program was announced to the 
industry at a petroleum conference in London on March 1, 2011. These were all 
improvements when compared to the Aynak bidding process.144 
Consistent with the Minister Shahrani’s push for transparency in the bidding 
process, measures were taken to conform to best practices. These included developing an 
economic model that would reasonably assure the highest rate of return on royalties for 
the Afghan government by providing consistent way to measure each companies bid. 
This drastically differed from the lack of an economic model for consistent comparison 
for the Aynak tender process. Information about the tender was available online including 
a question and answer session to address the concerns of bidders. International bidders 
interested in developing the concession needed to partner with local Afghan firms to have 
a qualified bid, and Afghan companies were brought in to help them organize and partner 
with international firms. Twelve entries were submitted with nine complete expressions 
of interest approved by the deadline of March 29, 2011. The group was further winnowed  
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to five after analysis from the selection committee using the Hydrocarbons Regulations. 
In all, the process was managed effectively, transparently, and expertly adhering to the 
legal principles outlined in the regulations.145 
Evaluating the bids for the project did produce controversy but no evidence of 
direct impropriety. An unnamed U.S. government official submitted a letter complaining 
about information the evaluation committee received that was not presented to committee 
overseeing the process. The letter urged for reevaluation and higher scoring of a specific 
bid. This letter indicated that the confidentiality of the evaluation proceedings had been 
compromised, but the independent consultants present believed that the protest letter was 
handled appropriately and did not affect the outcome of the process. The Amu Darya Oil 
Tender was approved by the committee in August and signed in October 2011. At this 
point, the transparency and efficacy in the process seemed sound but the outcome seemed 
questionable to some.146 
The Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) in conjunction with the 
Watan Group won the concession for the Amu Darya oil field. Competitors for the 
concession headed by Tethys Petroleum, a company run by former UN Ambassador 
Zalmay Khalilzad and his son, did not finish well in the evaluation process and have been 
vocal with their grievances. Alexander Benard, Khalilzad’s son, wrote two bitter and 
jingoistic opinion pieces stating that TFBSO of the Department of Defense should have 
been able to influence the process for a Western company to secure the concession. 
Khalilzad went on to clarify his position as criticizing TFBSOs role in establishing a 
process that ultimately favored a Chinese company over Western companies. He stated 
that CNPC’s bid was not a commercial bid and asserted that Chinese companies have a 
poor track record in honoring the terms of their contracts. These criticisms fit into the 
narrative of the United States spending blood and treasure to secure nations and then 
allowing Chinese companies to free ride at the expense U.S. interests. Attacking TFBSO 
for assisting in the project shows the lack of clarity on how to achieve the strategic end 
state of stability in Afghanistan. TFBSO worked to implement a transparent process that 
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would provide legitimacy to the Afghan Ministry of Mines and help secure a source of 
revenue for the Afghan government that is desperately needed. Nationalist arguments on 
how an American taxpayer-funded program through the Department of Defense helped a 
Chinese company win the concession are shortsighted at best and contrary to the end state 
of a stable Afghanistan at worst.147 
Despite the inappropriate calls to nationalism, questions about the Amu Darya 
concession remain. The Congressional Research Service identified that the Watan Group 
is owned by relatives of Afghan President Karzai.148 This does not prove that impropriety 
manipulated the process to be awarded to CNPC, but it does raise the possibility that the 
process was influenced for personal gain. Fundamentally, CNPC is guilty of partnering 
with a politically connected Afghan firm. While this may be unsavory, it is not illegal. 
President Karzai is no stranger to allegations of corrupt family dealings, as the murder of 
his half-brother in 2011 shows.149 What this deal shows is the susceptibility of any major 
deal in Afghanistan to allegations of corruption, whether real or imagined.  
CNPC won the Amu Darya concession because of the superiority of its bid, which 
consisted of:  
• A 15 percent royalty rate 
• A 30 percent government tax on CNPC  
• A profit sharing agreement of 70 percent with the Afghan Government 
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• Creating an estimated 7,000 jobs  
• Building a refinery in Afghanistan150 
Even though CNPC’s bid was superior, other factors were evaluated. CNPC has 
experience and future projects developing oil and gas fields in Turkmenistan and the 
pipeline infrastructure necessary to carry gas to China. The next highest bid offered 
royalty rates of 10 percent, and no other bid was guaranteed or had the financial backing 
of Chinese government banks.151 
CNPC’s bid represents a level of investment that other private companies were 
unable to counter. Ambassador Khalilzad’s critique that China’s state-owned companies 
have an advantage over Western firms is valid. Chinese SOEs do not have to answer to 
shareholders in the same way that Western publically traded firms do. With their access 
to capital, these firms are able to assume risks in unstable countries that Western firms 
cannot. SOEs are also able to offer infrastructure projects on a massive scale that would 
bankrupt Western firms. While these benefits offer an advantage to Chinese companies in 
gaining access to resources, they also leave Beijing with the bill if the deals fall through. 
Fortunately for Beijing, the impact of these deals failing is not enough to affect the 
financial health of China. This deal does point to Beijing’s strategic investment in 
Afghanistan. Beijing has seen what military involvement in Afghanistan has cost the 
United States and NATO and wants no part in it. It has watched the Soviet Union and the 
United States try to intervene in Afghanistan and largely fail. Economic investment 
allows China to play a positive role in the stability of the country without becoming 
trapped by politics and insecurity. The investments in Aynak and Amu Darya positions 
China to take advantage of Afghanistan’s natural resources in the future, while China 
waits for the security situation to improve.152 
China’s commitment Afghanistan’s future was evident when a member of the 
Politburo, Zhou Yongkang, visited Kabul in September 2012. This was the first visit of a 
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high-ranking Politburo official since Liu Shaoqi visited in 1966. As a former general 
manager of CNPC and a graduate of the Beijing Petroleum institute, Zhou’s meeting 
highlighted the importance of CNPCs interests in Afghanistan. Zhou’s primary objective 
during his visit was fulfilling his duties as domestic security representative on the 
Politburo. His visit emphasizes both the importance Beijing places on the security and 
stability of Afghanistan, and how it hopes to achieve stability through economic 
development.153 
Just like Aynak, Amu Darya has faced obstacles to development. The Amu Darya 
concession is located in northern Afghanistan near Mazar-e Sharif, which is a relatively 
secure area of the country. CNPC began production at Amu Darya in October 2012. The 
original plan was to move the oil by truck and refine it in Tajikistan. The deal fell through 
and CNPC attempted a new deal to refine the oil in Uzbekistan. As of August 2013, 
production at the Amu Darya wells was halted until a deal with the Uzbek refinery could 
be reached. The problem is that Afghanistan does not have its own refinery and is forced 
to import its hydrocarbon needs. The expense of importing energy increases costs and 
hampers economic development. It is estimated that Afghanistan needs between 20,000–
40,000 barrels of oil a day. A small refinery could meet the domestic demand for 
hydrocarbons and provide a boost to the economy.154 
Until a refinery is built in Afghanistan, CNPC will be subject to the deals it 
negotiates with Central Asian countries. CNPC is obligated to build a refinery, and has 
proposed to build it in Jowzjan, Afghanistan. When complete, the refinery will have the 
capacity to refine products from Amu Darya as well as another Afghan oil field being 
developed by a Turkish-UAE-Kuwaiti consortium. Building a refinery will take years and 
will be dependent on the hospitality of militant groups operating in the area.155 
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Security issues have caused delays at the Amu Darya concession. An Uzbek 
warlord led attacks against workers at the site in June of 2012. The warlord was intent on 
receiving his rent for operating in the area, but since the attacks ceased, it is assumed that 
some kind of agreement was reached. As a result of the attacks, Beijing offered to train 
300 Afghan policemen in order to protect the site. This is a prime example of the quid-
pro-quo that is a reality of doing business in Afghanistan.156 
From a strategic perspective, the Amu Darya concession was and is important to 
future investment in Afghanistan. The concession is one of the few international 
investment projects that have shown progress in Afghanistan. Production at Amu Darya 
bolsters confidence in the Chinese market for the beleaguered Aynak project.157 It also 
represents the progress the Ministry of Mines has made to be more transparent and 
accountable. This small bright spot in the licit Afghan economy gives an example of what 
successful development in Afghanistan could look like.  
F. PATTERNS OF CHINESE INVESTMENT IN AFGHANISTAN 
After discussing the major projects of Chinese SOEs in Afghanistan, this thesis 
now pivots to the implications of Chinese involvement in the Afghan economy. Chinese 
SOEs have taken note of the mineral and hydrocarbon wealth in Afghanistan and have 
moved to take advantage of them. Robert Kaplan wrote in the New York Times that “the 
problem is that while America is sacrificing its blood and treasure, the Chinese will reap 
the benefits.”158 Seeing Chinese investment as exploitative is accurate but not a complete 
assessment. As Andrew Small pointed out, “China would be making money in 
Afghanistan without a Western Military presence there—probably more—and they don’t 
see a [United States] security umbrella as the best way to protect their economic 
                                                 
156 Hamid Shalizi. “Afghans Say Former Warlord Meddling in China Oil Deal.” Reuters, June 11, 
2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/11/us-afghanistan-dostum-idUSBRE85A15W20120611; 
Pantucci. “Shifts in Beijing’s Afghan Policy.”  
157 Shalizi. “China’s CNPC Begins Oil Production in Afghanistan.” 
158 Robert Kaplan. “Beijing’s Afghan Gamble,” New York Times, October 6, 2009. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/opinion/07kaplan.html?_r=0. 
 74 
projects.”159 This argument gets at the crux of the separate views but common goals the 
United States and China have in Afghanistan. Both countries seek security, stability, and 
economic development, but both believe that these factors should be achieved in a 
different order. 
Through the end of 2013, it is estimated that the United States will have spent 
$641.7 billion on operations, security, and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.160 What 
these efforts and policies have achieved will be the subject of Chapter V of this thesis. 
U.S. and ISAF forces have created a level of security in parts of Afghanistan that has 
allowed foreign investment into the economy. Security in Afghanistan is still relative, and 
even well-trained Afghan National Security Forces barely control the perimeters of their 
bases, even after a decade of investing in training and equipping them.161 The U.S. and 
ISAF goal of securing Afghanistan in order to stabilize it has only been partially 
successful. The economics of the country are in disarray and the future stability of the 
country remains in doubt. China’s free riding on U.S. efforts should be seen as a positive 
outcome and not as a bitter pill. 
Colonel Greg Kleponis wrote a position piece for the Strategic Studies Institute in 
which he laid out the case for welcoming and encouraging Chinese free riding in 
Afghanistan. He estimated that approximately 20,000–30,000 Afghan jobs will be created 
by the Aynak project and that around 200,000 people will be supported by those jobs. 
This combined with the infrastructure projects tied to the mine project have the potential 
to benefit the government and the people of Afghanistan. Projects like these have the 
potential to encourage the growth of small businesses in Afghanistan and to provide 
significant and reliable income to the Afghan government. What history should teach 
those who believe China is free riding on U.S. and ISAF efforts in Afghanistan is that 
Chinese investment is the positive outcome of a successful conflict.162 
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Col. Kleponis offers a succinct interpretation of Chinese involvement in Africa 
that details the similarities between China’s African investments and the trajectory of 
activity in Afghanistan. He highlights the work of Deborah Brautigam, who has done 
extensive work on Chinese mining investments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and has identified patterns of activity from her study. There are two main strategies China 
uses in Africa to gain influence. First, China gains political influence by portraying itself 
as a developing country. Second, the Chinese model of economic development entices 
African countries, because it lacks the reliance on Western restrictions that are attached to 
aid and investment. According to critics, China’s lack of restrictions on investments 
support governments that commit atrocities, like those in Darfur, Sudan, but are in 
compliance with the Chinese respect for sovereignty in another state’s internal affairs. 
Because of lack of involvement in states’ internal affairs, China can be portrayed as a 
morally blind investor. Chinese companies seem to emphasize business over 
humanitarian concerns. Chinese businessmen do not care if a government is authoritarian 
with a centralized economy, or democratic with a capitalist economy; Chinese companies 
emphasize the contents of deals. Beijing offers enticements to African governments to 
cooperate with Chinese firms. These come in the form of no-strings-attached loans for 
infrastructure and development projects. Beijing accepts repayment of these loans with 
commodities such as oil. When the China Export–Import Bank offers traditional loans, 
the terms offered beat those offered by the IMF or World Bank. Backed by government 
funds, China’s SOEs offer higher royalty rates to host countries and guarantee that 30 
percent of subcontracting work will be done by local firms. Cheap and easy access to 
capital, preferential contracts, and commodity-financed infrastructure development have 
made China a major player in Africa over a short time span.163 
China’s experience in Africa bodes well for the development of Afghanistan. The 
current infrastructure agreements from Aynak and Amu Darya can be improved upon 
with loans for infrastructure development or other resource-funded projects. This will 
allow Afghanistan to develop the infrastructure needed to take advantage of its mineral 
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wealth. The morally blind character of investment will allow any Afghan government to 
secure funding to grow the economy of the country. 
Another pattern that might apply to future Chinese investment in Afghanistan 
relates to the PRC’s experience in developing Xinjiang in order to pacify it. Xinjiang has 
benefited from two central government-led economic development programs in the last 
20 years. When Deng Xiaoping created the special economic zones in the coastal 
provinces in the early 1980s, government investment flowed in to make the special 
economic zones a success. The special economic zones succeeded in developing the 
provinces and attracted vast amounts of foreign direct investment. The campaign to Open 
Up the North-West was initiated after the outbreak of separatism Xinjiang in the early 
1990s. In 1992, Deng said that the wealth generated in the coastal provinces needed to be 
redistributed to the western provinces by the turn of the century. This call spawned the 
campaign to Open Up the North-West. The campaign had multiple goals and did not 
uniquely focus on Xinjiang; simultaneously, there was a campaign to Open Up the South-
West. Jiang Zemin emphasized Deng’s challenge in a 1999 speech, which led to the 
campaign to Open Up the West. Five agendas for the new campaign emerged: a quest for 
equality between the rich coastal areas and the poor interior; the realization that accession 
to the World Trade Organization would benefit the dynamic areas of the Chinese 
economy and hurt areas where state-funded industry dominated; a need to connect and 
integrate geographic areas of China through transportation infrastructure; a long-held 
hope of assimilating ethnic minority groups and mitigating the threats they presented 
through economic development; and ecological improvement. The new campaign to 
Open Up the West promoted a strong central government role in economic development 
and showed populist consideration for the poor of China’s interior. These political points 
were taken up by Chinese bureaucrats and became more important because of the 
selection of the ruling elite in the 2002 16th Party Congress; President Hu Jintao had 
experience in western provinces and Politburo member, Wang Lequan, served as 
Xinjiang Party Secretary.164 
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A more circumspect view of the campaign to Open Up the West emphasizes it as 
a way to end the violence in Xinjiang and promote Han migration. Officials believed 
economic development channeled through the XPCC and the provincial Communist party 
apparatus would pacify the area. The Party used economic development combined with 
migration incentives to make the area more “loyal.” Economic development did not 
pacify the area but made the contrast between “loyal” ethnic Hans and Uighurs more 
stark. Disproportionate economic growth of the ethnic Han community versus the ethnic 
Uighur community fueled new Uighur grievances with the government. What is new in 
recent years is that the government is no longer hiding their intentions. The migration and 
economic growth objectives are no longer couched in language designed to emphasize 
the benefits for all in Xinjiang. One interpretation is that the state believes it has enough 
control over the area that it no longer needs to placate the minority. The Xinjiang Party 
secretary believes this control is tenuous and has acknowledged that economic 
development alone would not pacify separatist groups:165 
Currently there is a belief that the first priority for Xinjiang is to develop 
its economy. These people believe that after Xinjiang’s economy 
develops, people’s living standards will improve so the issue of stability 
will be resolved naturally. This belief is wrong and dangerous. Economic 
development cannot eliminate separatists and cannot prevent them from 
separating from the motherland and seeking independence.166 
Beijing’s experience in Xinjiang could translate to Afghanistan. The PRC has 
used economics as a tool pacify Xinjiang and as a tool to subjugate an ethnic minority. 
The government in Kabul has already made the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
a predominately ethnic Tajik or Northern Afghan organization.167 Karzai has used 
patronage for Northern Alliance warlords to maintain his grip on power. In this way, 
Afghanistan has already separated itself ethnically between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. 
Chinese-financed economic growth from the Amy Darya oil field has centered on 
Northern Afghanistan because of its security and geographic proximity to other Chinese 
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investments in Central Asia. If this trend were to continue, it would further allow the 
stabilization and economic development of northern Afghanistan at the expense of the 
southern Pashtun areas. This would allow the ethnic minorities in northern Afghanistan to 
benefit economically while punishing the Taliban stronghold in southern Afghanistan. 
Lack of economic development in the Pashtun south could create instability that could 
spill over the border and further exacerbate the ethnic problems in Pakistan’s Pashtun 
FATA region. A strategy like this could deprive the Taliban of its domestic allies and 
allies in Pakistan, weaken the Taliban economically, and eventually force the Taliban to 
the diplomatic bargaining table. 
1. SECTION CONCLUSION 
This section described the Aynak copper mine and the Amy Darya oil field 
projects under development by Chinese SOEs in Afghanistan. Both projects have 
suffered from allegations of corrupt bidding processes and significant delays to 
development. These delays may be the product of internal politics and lack of security, 
may represent skittish Chinese investors worried about the viability of their investments, 
or may be the product of a policy from Beijing to stall development in Afghanistan until 
U.S. and NATO forces exit the country. The evidence given in this section should point 
to the delays being driven by internal politics and insecurity rather than a conspiracy 
originating in Beijing. 
Beijing’s involvement in Afghanistan represents a win-win for U.S. and Chinese 
interests. Chinese SOEs will provide the economic boost Afghanistan needs to sustain 
economic growth. U.S. interests are served because after more than a decade of fighting, 
the security-first approach has failed to achieve stability. Chinese SOEs may be free 
riding on American and NATO security gains, but future stability in Afghanistan is more 
important to U.S. security goals. Beijing’s actions in Afghanistan are not unique and 
follow the pattern of development China has established in other areas, such as Africa. 
The United States should welcome and work to promote Chinese investment in 
Afghanistan in order to stabilize the government and the country.  
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Beijing has dealt with security problems emanating from ethnic minorities in 
Xinjiang and their experience could prove useful in dealing with the ethnic factions in 
Afghanistan. While Afghanistan is by no means the sole foreign policy focus of Beijing, 
it represents the potential for future economic integration for Central and South Asia, 
which will benefit China in the long term.  
G. SECTION III: FUTURE CHINESE AND AFGHAN PROJECTS 
Beijing has invested in Afghanistan as a means of stabilizing the country without 
becoming involved in the politics or security of the state. In order to determine the 
current policy stance of the PRC toward Afghanistan, it is necessary to review current 
and future projects. These projects are a part of geopolitics of the region and highlight the 
potential and pitfalls of Beijing’s current approach. Afghanistan’s future depends on 
many factors, but it will be positioned for success if the Afghan economy can gain a 
foothold toward independence from foreign aid. Afghanistan will play a key role in the 
future stability and economic development of Central and South Asia. One of the key 
areas of insecurity for the region is energy-related infrastructure development. Only by 
understanding the economic necessity driving China’s worldwide energy investment can 
Afghanistan’s role in China’s and South Asia’s energy security be made clear. Energy 
security and economic revival of the region can be attained through economic and 
transportation integration. Afghanistan’s geography connects it to Central and South Asia 
and can serve as a conduit for the transport of goods, or as a roadblock for commerce and 
energy transportation. 
1. Afghanistan 
The first priority of the Afghan government should be to reduce dependence on 
foreign aid. In their paper “Finishing the Job: Jump-Start Afghanistan’s Economy,” 
Frederick Starr and Adib Farhadi presented a solution to provide the Afghan government 
and economy with income prior to mining projects being completed. The main tenet of 
the paper is that “economic development in Afghanistan is not something to be pursued 
after political stability and security have been established; rather, it is what must be 
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achieved in order to forge political stability and communal peace.”168 Starr and Farhadi’s 
statement emphasizes the income critical to the future of the Afghan government before 
international aid decreases after 2014. Stability through economic development is the 
structure behind China’s approach to Afghanistan and fits Starr’s thesis. The paper 
establishes that the assumptions ISAF has been working under for the last ten years have 
not been successful. In order to avert the collapse of the Afghan economy, the 
international community must prioritize and strengthen their approach to the economy. 
Starr’s immediate priorities are to open up trade flows between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
work with neighboring nations to reduce bureaucratic and corrupt impediments to border 
trade, establish three to four free-trade areas along the border of Afghanistan, and 
organize cotton caravans for transport of cotton from Central Asia to the ports of Gwadar 
or Chabahar. These short-term initiatives could provide income to the Afghan 
government and promote the Afghan economy. Conflict and tensions have prevented 
further integration of the Afghan and Pakistani economies, and are unlikely to be 
overcome in the short term. The same holds true for decreasing corruption and 
bureaucratic red tape along Afghanistan’s borders. Free-trade zones along the Afghan 
border could provide an impetus to develop the Afghan economy, but the central 
government would need to be compensated for lost tariffs. The simplest and most likely 
proposal is the establishment of cotton caravans from Central Asia to ports in Pakistan 
and Iran. The Afghan National Security forces could secure large convoys from Central 
Asia to the ports, but would need the cooperation of producers in Central Asia and their 
governments. The United States, China, or European Nations could champion this project 
readily and successfully. While Western nations struggle with the implications of their 
extraction from the war in Afghanistan, China is focused on longer-term economic 
development. 
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2. Energy Security 
Afghanistan’s geographic location and stability currently affect China’s access to 
hydrocarbon resources from Central Asia, and could affect China’s and South Asia’s 
long-term access to hydrocarbons. The term energy security is generally defined in China 
as the “strategy the country uses to ensure adequate, affordable, and reliable supply of 
oil.” To understand the importance of energy security in Beijing’s foreign relations, it is 
necessary to understand the energy situation in China. 
China became a net importer of oil in 1993 and the world’s largest net importer of 
oil in 2009. In 2011, China accounted for half of the world’s net increase in oil 
consumption; hence, China is the largest source of new demand in the world energy 
market. Since China imports 5.5 million barrels a day, and 69 percent of the imported oil 
comes from Africa and the Middle East, China is dependent on oil tanker traffic for the 
majority of its imports. Domestically, China produces 4.3 million barrels of oil, and that 
figure is projected to rise to only 4.7 million barrels a day by 2035. By 2035, it is 
estimated that China will import 75 percent of its oil. As a result of flat domestic 
production, China will need to import more oil in order to sustain economic growth, and 
will become more dependent on open access to sea-lanes for those imports.169 
Energy security affects the security calculus in Beijing and has become a driving 
factor in formulating policy. The “Malacca Dilemma” was introduced to national 
prominence by Hu Jintao in a speech given in November 2003. In the speech, President 
Hu Jintao stated that 80 percent of China’s imported oil from Africa and the Middle East 
passes through the Strait of Malacca on its way to eastern ports in China. First, the oil 
tankers must navigate through the Strait of Malacca between the Malaysian Peninsula and 
the island of Sumatra. This choke point facilitates interdiction by hostile parties. The 
strait has historically been home to pirate bands but the threat of interdiction by naval 
forces could halt tanker traffic. Because the U.S. Navy has a port in Singapore and is the 
world’s predominate naval power, Beijing views the U.S. Navy blocking the Strait of 
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Malacca as a serious threat to its energy security. Beijing has attempted to address this 
threat in a variety of ways. To avoid the dilemma, proposed pipelines will run from the 
port of Gwadar in Pakistan and the port of Kyaukphyu in Burma into China. These 
pipelines will divert traffic from the Strait of Malacca and slightly decrease the overall 
number of vessels traversing the strait. The downside is that pipelines in Pakistan and 
Burma will only modestly decrease Beijing’s maritime vulnerability. As of 2013, the 
pipeline in Burma is operational but construction has not begun on the pipeline in 
Pakistan. Beijing must look for other sources of petroleum in order to diversify its 
production, or be able to project naval power to protect the sea-lanes. Both options will 
be expensive and building a vast blue-water naval fleet will increase tensions with 
China’s maritime neighbors. Building a large blue-water navy would contradict China’s 
“peaceful rise” policy, so it is likely that China will look northward and eastward to 
secure new sources of petroleum.170 
There is a significant domestic component that pushes Chinese policymakers to 
prioritize China’s energy security. In 2003–04 China experienced blackouts in 24 out of 
31 provinces from power shortages. Blackouts forced consumers to use diesel-powered 
generators, which pushed refined petroleum demand up 15 percent and increased net 
imports by 50 percent. This forced the PRC to restructure the national energy sector 
management, to embark on a program to ease centralized price controls of petroleum 
products, and to establish a national petroleum reserve. The effects of this crisis still 
reverberate. In a 2012 poll, 90 percent of Chinese believed that energy security will affect 
China’s national interests in the next decade. Energy security is a priority for China’s 
policymakers but the options for supply are limited.171 
Beijing has taken significant action to fortify Chinese energy security by 
developing Central Asian energy production and infrastructure. Beijing accomplished this 
by increasing SOE investment in Central Asia, and built numerous pipelines in order to 
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ensure “unfettered access to the natural resources of the region.”172 China is Central 
Asia’s biggest trading partner with exports of manufactured goods and imports of 
extracted resources, totaling approximately 85 percent for each. China’s first international 
pipeline, the Sino-Kazakh pipeline, was completed in 2006 and connects Kazakh oil and 
gas to Xinjiang. During the 2008 financial crisis, China used its currency reserves and its 
state-owned banks to secure Turkmenistan’s largest gas field and the largest Kazak state-
owned oil company. Through various acquisitions and joint ventures, it is estimated that 
China now controls 50 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil and gas production. The biggest 
success story for China is the China–Central Asia gas pipeline, completed in 2012, which 
connects Turkmenistan’s vast gas fields to Xinjiang. These international pipelines have 
reversed the traditional flow of Central Asian hydrocarbons from Russia to China. 
Domestically, China has built pipelines to take in oil from its western areas and Central 
Asia. The West-to-East pipeline starts at the Central Asian border connecting that 
network to the oil and gas fields of the Tarim and Junggar basins in Xinjiang, then 
stretches all the way to the terminus along China’s industrial east coast. As of April 2013, 
there are three West-East pipelines with a fourth and fifth lines in the planning stages. 
These projects will alleviate some of China’s dependence on maritime imported oil, but 
China has bigger plans for development of hydrocarbons from Central Asia and possibly 
the Middle East.173 
3. The Gwadar Port Project 
China’s long-standing relationship with Pakistan supports China’s geostrategic 
competition against India, but the Gwadar Port Project represents a new phase in that 
competition. On one level, the Gwadar Port offers potential access to the sea, and 
international markets, for Xinjiang and the Central Asian states. The port is located in the 
western Pakistan province of Baluchistan, not far from the border with Iran. Beijing paid 
a Chinese company to construct the deep-water port and a Chinese company now 
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manages it. On another level, the port is a linchpin in an overall Chinese–Pakistani 
infrastructure development project with multiple road, rail, and pipeline projects. 
Strategically located near the Strait of Hormuz, the Gwadar Port and its associated 
infrastructure would allow goods, trade, and energy transport from the Middle East to 
western China and Central Asia. This massive project would open up the region to world 
markets. At the strategic level, this project has major energy security implications. If 
built, the Gwadar pipeline would traverse 1,500 miles and rise to 15,000 feet as it 
followed the Karakorum Highway from Pakistan into China. Although the project is 
technically feasible, the pipeline and associated infrastructure could cost as much as $20 
billion for the completed project. Another energy security project in Gwadar is a 
proposed refinery. Feasibility studies point to a $12 billion refinery being built at Gwadar 
to supply refined petroleum products to the region. The implications are vast for a 
completed Gwadar Port and associated infrastructure. First, the project would open up 
trade to Central Asia and western China. Second, the project represents the possible 
establishment of a second energy corridor into China from the Indian Ocean. While this 
corridor would only slightly improve maritime security for Chinese oil tankers, it would 
facilitate trade between the Middle East and Central Asia. Third, this project represents a 
significant investment in the future of the region and the role China wishes to play.174 
From Afghanistan’s viewpoint, a deep-water port at Gwadar and the associated 
infrastructure in Pakistan would give Afghanistan access to international markets. Road 
and rail links from Pakistan into Afghanistan would promote the development of Afghan 
mineral wealth and of the overall Afghan economy. With links established to the sea, 
goods like cotton from Central Asia could reach international markets as well. North-
south transport of goods would also supply a steady stream of income for Afghanistan.175 
4. The Port of Chabahar, Iran 
The Indian–Iranian partnership to construct the port has eroded after infrastructure 
in Afghanistan fell into Taliban control. The Indian government worked with the Afghan 
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government to build a road linking Delaram to Zaranj in western Afghanistan. This road 
connected the Afghan ring road to the Iranian border. A different project funded by the 
government of Iran linked the western Afghan city of Herat to Iran by rail. These 
infrastructure projects will allow goods to flow from western and southern Afghanistan to 
the port of Chabahar in South-East Iran. In June 2013, a Chinese company made a bid to 
take control of the development and operations of the port. This development enhances 
the possibility of an Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline that would create an energy corridor from 
Iran into China. This could further alleviate China’s reliance on maritime imported 
energy. The pipeline linking Iran and Pakistan has been under consideration since the 
1990s, but the United States has strongly pressured Pakistan to drop the project in favor 
of the TAPI pipeline project.176 
5. The TAPI Pipeline 
The TAPI, Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipeline, began in 
the1990s with the goal of connecting the Caspian Sea to India. The intent was to supply 
South Asia with energy for its growing populations and alleviate chronic energy 
shortages. Following two key agreements on transit and dividing gas production in 2010, 
the project was to break ground in 2012 and finish in 2014 with a price tag of $7.6 
billion. The project would benefit the nations involved by providing energy, jobs, and 
fees to energy-starved markets. Several factors have delayed the start of the project. 
Turkmenistan backed out of the agreement because of group pricing and has since 
renegotiated prices with Pakistan and India, and recently signed an agreement with 
Afghanistan. Even though these obstacles have been overcome, other serious concerns 
remain. None of the TAPI countries have the necessary domestic technical experience 
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running a pipeline of this size and complexity and have relied on contracted maintenance 
for other projects. The most significant hurdle this project faces is the most basic; how do 
you secure a 1,700-kilometer pipeline that runs through one of the most insecure 
countries in the world? Afghanistan has proposed using 7,000 security personnel to 
secure the line. These security personnel may not be enough since the Turkish Army has 
not been successful in securing the BTC pipeline in Turkey, and it is likely that problems 
in Afghanistan would be more severe. The United States is pressuring Pakistan to sign 
the deal, but security and diplomatic hurdles will prevent the project from completion 
within the next few years.177 
President Xi Jinping and President Berdimuhamedov of Turkmenistan signed an 
agreement on September 3, 2013, on the maintenance and development of the gas fields 
that were the source of the TAPI pipeline. This agreement secures more gas resources for 
China, but also granted CNPC and China the primary decision on the future of the TAPI 
pipeline. This deal seems to have been accepted by U.S. interests since it was not 
blocked. This instance highlights the growing power and control China has in the Central 
Asian region and promotion of China’s overall plan for economic development.178 
6. Transportation 
The lack of railroads in Afghanistan is not by accident but by design. As part of 
the original “Great Game” in Central and South Asia, the Russian tsars and British 
Empire agreed to create a buffer zone in Afghanistan. This agreement held until Afghan 
independence after WWI. The leader of Afghanistan at the time, Amir Abdul Rahman, 
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took it upon himself to prevent the construction or railroads by either empire in 
Afghanistan. The Convention of St. Petersburg, signed between Britain and Russia in 
1907, ended the rivalry for territory in Afghanistan and the prospects of a railroad there. 
During the 20th century, many rail development plans were drawn up, and some even 
achieved preliminary financing, but they were all eventually abandoned. Lack of 
infrastructure has prevented investment and growth in Afghanistan to the present day.179 
Afghanistan’s development hinges on infrastructure development because it sits 
on the intersection of North-South and East-West routes that could connect Eurasia. The 
U.S. State Department started the “New Silk Road” strategy as way of promoting trade 
and fortifying Afghanistan against terrorist elements. The problem was that Afghanistan 
has only 100 kilometers of railway as of March 2013. To make matters worse, there are 
multiple different gauges, or distance between tracks, used in Afghanistan’s neighboring 
countries. A Chinese company conducted a feasibility study of linking Aynak to 
Uzbekistan by rail and estimated the project to cost $4 billion. There is currently no 
feasibility study of the rail link between Kabul and Gwadar. The proposed Afghan 
national rail network is estimated to cost $54 billion and would have to be funded 
through resource-backed loans since Kabul does not have the hard currency to support 
such an endeavor. Beijing would be amenable to funding such a project since it already 
has similar agreements with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The Asia Development Bank 
has highlighted the potential for Afghanistan to become a regional trade hub, but until a 
financial backer with deep pockets, patience, and leverage pushes the project forward, it 
will continue to be an unrealized dream.180 
Beijing has already taken the initiative to develop trade routes in Central Asia and 
is working toward more interconnectedness. Hewlett-Packard is using a new rail line 
across Kazakhstan to get laptops from eastern China to Europe faster than it would take 
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by container ship, and cheaper than it would cost to transport by air. It is estimated that 
this rail line will carry $1 billion worth of goods by 2014. Opening central and western 
China to trade with Europe allows China to continue its economic development by 
allowing companies to take advantage of lower labor cost in central and western China. 
The PRC has seen the benefit of developing its own Silk Road strategy. China’s 
President, Xi Jinping, proposed a Silk Road economic belt in September 2013. While the 
details of this program are vague, Chinese emphasis on developing infrastructure and 
commerce in Central Asia has the potential to benefit to Afghanistan.181 
H. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has focused on the Afghan economy, the economic interests of China 
in Afghanistan, and the future of Chinese involvement in Afghanistan and the greater 
Central and South Asia region. Afghanistan has large deposits of untapped resources that 
could fuel economic growth, stabilize government income, and promote stability in the 
country if managed effectively. Many factors work against future stability in 
Afghanistan. Corruption and the black market economy empower destabilizing forces 
while delegitimizing the central government. Chinese SOEs are capable of operating and 
taking advantage of corruption in Afghanistan, but it is in their long-term interests to 
promote transparency and the legitimacy of the central government. 
As the Aynak and Amu Darya deposits show, there is large potential for Chinese 
investment in Afghanistan and an abundance of natural resources to choose from. Afghan-
Chinese business partnerships will produce jobs for Afghans, profits for Chinese companies, 
and help to stabilize a country that has been at war for the last three decades. The United 
States should welcome Chinese investment as a way to stabilize Afghanistan in a way that the 
U.S. security-first policy has been unable to. Chinese SOEs have authentic interests in 
Afghanistan that do not represent a threat or denigrate American efforts in the country. 
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China’s investment in Afghanistan could take many paths in the future. Beijing 
has shown that it is serious about development of the region through massive projects like 
the port of Gwadar and taking on the responsibility for development of the Chabahar port 
in Iran. Integrating Central and South Asia with pipelines and rail lines will only facilitate 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis is to show what motivates China’s interests in 
Afghanistan through an analysis of its current and future activities. A few major themes 
characterize Chinese interest and activities in Afghanistan: China brings countries on its 
periphery into its sphere of influence through economic integration; the necessity and 
pattern of developing resource extraction in foreign countries; the emphasis Beijing 
places on the security of Xinjiang and the efforts the PRC goes to ensure that security; 
and the amoral business-centric focus of Chinese engagement in its periphery.  
Beijing exercises similar foreign policy in its periphery by focusing on resource 
extraction and following a pattern in the development of relationships. First, China and 
the target country sign an agreement of friendship and good neighborliness. Next, 
Chinese companies begin to develop deals for resource extraction and trade between the 
countries. This tentative relationship is sealed with bilateral trade agreements focusing on 
win-win situations that tend to largely benefit Chinese business. Once this step is taken, 
Beijing offers a strategic partnership to the country in exchange for access to capital for 
infrastructure development and resource extraction projects. The process continues with 
abolishment of tariffs on the focus country’s imports to China. It culminates with the 
partner countries inclusion in China’s network of multilateral engagement. This pattern 
succeeds in tying the target country to China and bringing it into China’s sphere of 
influence.  
Beijing’s diplomacy in Central Asia ties the development economic relationships 
to the adoption of Chinese norms with the goal of bolstering security in China and the 
target state. The major vehicle for achieving this in Central Asia is the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization. The SCO has achieved some success in counterterrorism 
efforts in Central Asia and is pushing to develop better economic ties between nations 
through the development of Chinese infrastructure projects. CNPC and other SOEs are 
building pipelines, railroads, and highways to connect China’s interior to Central Asia 
and eventually the Middle East, Europe, and South Asia. One of the main benefits to 
China of promoting the SCO is to encourage the target country fighting the “three evils” 
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of separatism, extremism, and terrorism as specified in the SCO’s charter. This 
internationalizes Beijing’s approach to the separatist province of Xinjiang and legitimizes 
China’s repressive activities there.  
Beijing and CCP bureaucrats are deeply concerned with fighting the three evils in 
Xinjiang. The CCP bases its legitimacy on holding onto and acquiring territories formerly 
held by the Qing dynasty.182 If the active separatist movement in Xinjiang were to 
succeed, it could strike a mortal blow to the CCP’s legitimacy. This is why Beijing puts 
much effort into maintaining the security state in Xinjiang and attempts to pacify it 
through economic development.  
How Beijing has dealt with Xinjiang offers a window into how Beijing might 
react to a security threat in Afghanistan. The first objective in Xinjiang is to mollify 
rebellious populations with economic development. This has been achieved through 
massive government spending on building infrastructure and extractive industries. The 
second objective is pacification of the population through the actions of the security state. 
Building a security state in Afghanistan would not be possible for Beijing, but it could 
reinforce the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and use the SCO as a tool to 
legitimize any military activity. One of the key takeaways from the Chinese experience in 
Xinjiang is Beijing’s ability to navigate and subjugate ethnic clashes between peoples. 
Afghanistan is rife with ethnic and tribal tensions. Beijing will be able to manipulate 
those tensions through its allies in Pakistan and Central Asia. China will be the prime 
arbiter of security in Central Asia, and, together with Russia, has the ability to greatly 
influence the outcome of the conflict in Afghanistan and long-term stability in Central 
Asia.183  
The high profile projects Chinese companies have taken on in Afghanistan 
illustrate Beijing’s strategy of economic engagement. China’s trade surpluses with the 
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U.S. and the rest of the world have enabled Chinese state-owned banks to fund high-risk 
investments in countries like Afghanistan. The copper mine at Mes Aynak and the oil 
fields of Amu Darya are typical of Chinese extractive industry investment. In both 
tenders, SOEs outbid other investors by taking advantage of financing from China’s 
state-owned banks. The bidding process was highly corrupted in the Mes Aynak case, 
and suspicious in the Amu Darya case. Both projects have been plagued by delays 
because of security concerns, local political issues, and hesitancy among the SOEs due to 
the cost of associated infrastructure investment. While both projects have opened the 
door for future investment in the vast mineral resources in Afghanistan, their completion 
is dependent on the security situation in Afghanistan.  
A. THE UNITED STATES IN AFGHANISTAN 
The future in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to how the United States and 
NATO forces withdraw forces in 2014 and what they are able to accomplish before they 
leave. U.S. military leaders have followed a strategy since the start of the war that has 
produced successes and failures in the war in Afghanistan. The strategy contains five 
premises:  
1. Afghan officials will attain Total domestic control. 
2. The United States will supply billions of dollars of projects to woo 
the local tribes to cooperate.  
3. The U.S. military will conduct a war of attrition to drive back the 
Taliban. 
4. The United States will tolerate a sanctuary for the enemy in 
Pakistan. 
5. The United States and NATO will slowly build up Afghan forces 
to fight their own war.184 
This strategy is responsible for the mediocre successes of the Afghan government, 
the moderate successes of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and the initial 
defeat of the Taliban. What this strategy lacked was a historical and cultural 
understanding of Afghanistan and how those elements should shape the future of the 
                                                 
184 Bing West. “Groundhog War: The Limits of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.” Foreign Affairs 
90, no. 5 (September/ October 2011): 163–71.  
 94 
country. The early tactical success of the initial defeat of the Taliban has led to a strategic 
failure and resulted in a prolonged war with a planned expiration date of December 2014.  
The U.S. perspective on war termination in Afghanistan began with the heady 
resolve to create a vibrant democracy in Central Asia, and is ending with an explicit 
negative goal of denying sanctuary to terrorists. Some experts assess the administration’s 
goal in Afghanistan to be: “one, that terrorists who wish to strike the United States and its 
allies not use Afghanistan as their base, and two, that insurgent groups not use 
Afghanistan’s territory to destabilize its neighbors, especially Pakistan.”185 In other 
words, the future of the Afghan government and the Afghan people are secondary to the 
primary goal of preventing terrorist organizations from using Afghanistan as base of 
operations. Even this limited objective depends on the success and resilience of the 
Afghan government. The question then becomes: What will the U.S. and NATO forces 
accomplish before withdrawing, and will there be U.S. forces in Afghanistan after 2014?  
The purpose behind setting an expiration date on the war in Afghanistan was to 
balance political and military realities. When the new Barack Obama administration 
debated about the number of troops to surge into Afghanistan in 2009, they were really 
debating on which tactics were to be used to fight the war. General McChrystal outlined a 
robust counterinsurgency strategy, a limited counterinsurgency strategy, and a limited 
counterterrorism strategy to fight the war in Afghanistan. The administration chose a 
limited counterinsurgency strategy of 30,000 additional U.S. troops. In addition, 
President Obama placated the war-weary faction of the Democratic Party by establishing 
an expiration date on U.S. involvement in combat in Afghanistan. This compromise was 
to handicap the U.S. counterinsurgency efforts before they began. In essence, the war in 
Afghanistan is not ending; only the timeline for U.S. participation in combat operations is 
expiring.186 
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In order to achieve an orderly drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, the Obama 
administration realized that negotiations with the Taliban were necessary. Negotiations 
with the Taliban, however, are fraught with problems that may be insurmountable. The 
first problem is: Whom the United States should negotiate with. The standard answer is 
that we should negotiate with the moderate Taliban who are interested in taking a place in 
the Afghan government. This becomes problematic because the Taliban are a fractured 
network of ideologically driven elements loosely bound to their leader, Mullah Omar. 
Besides Omar, no single voice speaks for, or has credibility with, the coalition of the 
Taliban. Another problem with negotiations is the insistence of continuing to fight while 
negotiating. This is a structural problem with the negotiations in which both sides try to 
increase their bargaining position through continuing combat operations prior to coming 
to the negotiating table. The United States lacks credibility in negotiations because it has 
already stated that it will withdraw combat forces at the end of 2014. The Taliban’s 
number one goal is expulsion of foreign powers from Afghanistan; they need only to wait 
until the end of 2014 to achieve it. Time is on the Taliban’s side and there is little the 
United States can do to put pressure on the Taliban to negotiate.187  
In order to get the Taliban to the bargaining table, some critics have called for 
Pakistan to exert their influence of the Taliban. This is not a feasible scenario for many 
reasons. The Taliban have some degree of sanctuary in Pakistan, therefore, Pakistan has 
some leverage over the Afghan Taliban, but the extent of that leverage is unknown. It is 
possible that Pakistan could exert some influence over the Taliban to force them to the 
bargaining table, but while possible, this scenario is not feasible. Pakistan has 
traditionally viewed Afghanistan within its concept of strategic depth versus India. The 
theory’s foundation is based on Pakistan having an amicable and pliant relationship with 
whoever controls Afghanistan. This would allow Pakistan to avoid fighting a two-front 
war, avoid foreign power influence creating disturbances in Pakistan, and avoid further 
complications in another conflict over Kashmir. While strategic depth makes some sense 
as a war plan, the current relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan would not 
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support this strategy. The conflict over the Durand Line, Pakistani support for the 
Taliban, and the general blame placed on Pakistan by President Karzai for all of 
Afghanistan’s problems negates the concept of strategic depth. Strategic depth may not 
be a feasible strategy but it is currently the policy of Pakistan and it would take great 
efforts and assurances by both the United States and China to change the policy. China 
and the United States both have some leverage in Pakistan; China, however, is much 
more popular than the United Sates in Pakistan and likely has greater influence. Trying to 
pressure the Taliban by asking Pakistan to use its leverage or trying to pressure Pakistan 
by asking China to use its leverage puts too many proxies with competing interests 
between the Taliban and the United States.188 
B. POST-2014 AFGHANISTAN 
Prior to evaluating U.S. and Chinese policy leading up to and after 2014, it is 
necessary to look at what scenarios are likely post-2014. The Afghan government, the 
United States, and China all have a stake in the outcome in Afghanistan but to varying 
degrees. To the Afghan government, 2014 could mean the end of its existence or the 
dawning of a new age of progress and autonomy. To the United States, 2014 could mark 
the beginning of a strategic defeat and humiliation or a passable extrication from a 
foreign adventure. To China, 2014 could mark to return of terrorist threats or the 
beginning of a new strategic and economic relationship.  
Some assumptions must be made in order to approximate outcomes in 
Afghanistan:  
• The Afghan government will continue to be corrupt.  
• The Afghan government has reached the limit of its control in rural areas 
and villages, and will likely lose some central control post–2014.  
• The ANSF will continue to gain experience, and most likely capability, 
but will not be able to increase its end strength due to attrition.  
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• Presidential elections will occur and Karzai will no longer be in power.  
• Once U.S. and NATO forces leave at the end of 2014, they will not return.  
It is also assumed that a civil war in Afghanistan is unacceptable to Afghans, the 
United States, China, Pakistan, and the broader region. Although a civil war in 
Afghanistan is an unacceptable outcome to many parties, it may not be avoidable in the 
short or long term. 
In 2010, Naveed Muktar, a major general in the Pakistan Army, laid out four 
scenarios for post–2014 Afghanistan and their implications. In the first scenario, 
“Fumbled Hand-off” negotiations give the moderate Taliban a place in government and 
U.S. and NATO forces withdraw. The Taliban eventually are able to take control of the 
government because the Afghan people lose faith in the central government due to 
chronic ineffectiveness and corruption. 
The Taliban guarantee that Al Qaeda or other terrorist networks will not have safe 
haven in Afghanistan, and that poppy cultivation will be curbed. These assurances are 
enough keep regional actors from further interference and the Afghan economy sputters 
along. This is a “marginally acceptable” outcome for the U.S. and China because it 
prevents terrorism against the United States and China and allows Chinese SOEs access 
to Afghan minerals.189 
The second scenario, called “The Whole Nine Yards,” states that the Afghan 
central government maintains power by giving up some control to the provinces and 
districts. This is reinforced by integrating the Taliban into the government through 
successful negotiations. In this scenario, Afghanistan receives substantial aid from the 
United States and the international community to increase its capability. This is the most 
stable and attractive scenario because it allows for robust international investment in 
Afghanistan. The United States would continue to support and develop the ANSF to 
prevent a resurgence of lawlessness. Regional powers are kept from interfering by the 
larger powers, and China and the United States no longer worry about terrorist threats 
emanating from Afghanistan. America would need to remain intimately involved in the 
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development of Afghanistan, but would retain international credibility and moral 
authority. Both of these scenarios provide for the U.S. objective of denying terrorist 
groups safe haven, and both allow for economic development of Chinese investments. 
The problem is that both of these scenarios are predicated on a negotiated settlement with 
the Taliban, which seems unlikely.190 
The worst outcome, “Decline into Chaos,” is the outbreak of civil war after the 
implosion of the Afghan government. If U.S. and NATO forces leave hastily because a 
bilateral security agreement is not signed, the Afghan government will likely fail because 
of corruption and the desertion of security forces. Warlords, militias, the Northern 
Alliance, and the Taliban will again fight for control of the country. This civil war will be 
much worse than the last because allied forces have spent the last decade equipping and 
training the Afghan security forces while Taliban fighters have been gaining combat 
experience. To make matters worse, regional players will align with different factions and 
arm them. The fierce fighting will invite neighboring countries to provide conventional 
assistance, and forces from Pakistan, India, Iran, and Central Asian states could battle for 
control of Afghanistan or cooperate in the hopes of containing the fighting. Millions of 
refugees would flee Afghanistan into neighboring states, placing more pressure on 
volatile regions like the FATA. Eventually, insurgencies in the region could assert 
themselves as central governments become weakened or distracted by events in 
Afghanistan. The international community and the United States, which recently left 
Afghanistan, would have to stand by, helplessly, as the situation worsened. The only 
possible response to this scenario would be a UN-sponsored peacekeeping mission 
manned by Muslim countries. Beijing’s security state in Xinjiang would be tested, but 
would likely hold, but terrorist would be able to establish sanctuary in and around 
Afghanistan to export violence. This would be a humiliation for the United States and 
would destroy its reputation in the Muslim world for decades.191 
 The last scenario Muktar lays out is the “Dead Man Walking” scenario, in which 
the Afghan central government is able to cling to power, for a time. This scenario does 
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not differ much from the civil war scenario because the central government eventually 
fails because of weakness and corruption. The main difference is that since there is no 
active terrorist threat from Afghanistan, the United States is unable to intercede in the 
conflict. Both this scenario and the civil war scenario are likely in the absence of an 
agreement with the Taliban.192  
A few themes emerge from these thought experiments: primarily, negotiations 
with the Taliban are crucial to the outcome in Afghanistan. There are two courses of 
action for the Taliban: either become a part of the political system or seize power once 
the current system has failed. From the Taliban’s perspective, they will win back control 
in Afghanistan regardless. The U.S. and China need to exert pressure and use their 
leverage if they value an outcome besides civil war in Afghanistan. Another major theme 
is the importance of how the U.S. and NATO forces withdraw from Afghanistan. A 
precipitous withdrawal will ensure civil war in Afghanistan. Even a well designed and 
executed withdrawal poses many risks because of the weakness of the Afghan 
government. That is why it is essential that the U.S. forces some changes in the Afghan 
government prior to December 2014. First, the single nontransferable vote must be 
repealed. This electoral arrangement allows candidates who receive less than 1 percent of 
the vote to serve in government. This delegitimizes the process because it allows for 
unequal representation. Next, the Afghan central government must be forced to 
decentralize some aspects of control. Historically, Karzai has been given the power to 
appoint provincial and district governors, and at times local government officials and 
clerks. Afghanistan has not had a strong central government that was able to push its 
authority into every corner of the country. It is illogical to try to increase the 
government’s writ at this point because of the future absence of U.S. and NATO forces. 
A decentralized democracy would allow some areas of the country to be ruled by the 
Taliban or fall under sharia law, but this is a better outcome than the collapse of the 
central government.193  
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The basic elements of a settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan 
government are conceivable: the Taliban must respect the Afghan Constitution, renounce 
armed conflict, and sever ties with Al Qaeda.194 Decentralization in the Afghan 
government could be extended to accommodate the Taliban. Even if the central 
government divests control of the provinces it could still act as a stabilizing force as long 
as red lines are respected. As long as provinces do not violate the central government’s 
foreign policy, do not infringe on a neighboring province, or seize natural resources or 
promote narcotics, the central government could give autonomy to the provinces. The 
central government would still maintain the ANSF to moderate disputes between 
provinces and clans. Warlords may wrest control from elected authorities, but would be 
kept in check by other provinces and the central government. This system would require 
few state institutions and would allow the people to decide their fate in each province. 
The central government would have a monopoly on foreign aid and could control its flow 
to assure allegiance. What each provincial government did would be transparent to the 
people, and each province could choose its own laws. While corruption and narcotics 
trafficking are a risk in this system, even this weak system is preferable to outright civil 
war.195 
Afghanistan’s future is currently in the balance, but the United States and China 
still can play a role in its outcome. Negotiations with the Taliban will determine a large 
part of the outcome in Afghanistan, but geopolitical rivalry between the United States and 
China may prevent negotiations from taking place. As stated earlier, the U.S.–China 
relationship is deep and collaborative, but shows signs of strain. Mutual mistrust of 
intentions prevents the nations from finding common ground on geopolitical problems. 
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states in accordance with the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” In the event of a 
civil war in Afghanistan, China’s intervention policy may change because the stakes to its 
interests are so high.196  
Even with mutual mistrust, there are areas where the United States and China can 
cooperate in Afghanistan. The United States could and should promote Chinese business 
ventures in Afghanistan. More Chinese nationals in Afghanistan means that China has a 
greater stake in the outcome of the 2014 transition. A larger stake means that Beijing may 
be more willing to use its leverage to affect the outcome in Afghanistan. While China is 
unlikely to use its own military forces in Afghanistan, SCO countries including Russia 
could be prompted to prepare to intervene in Afghanistan if necessary. In fact, Russia has 
already mobilized the CSTO to increase military air assets in the region and train 
peacekeepers specifically for this contingency. Although Russia and the Central Asian 
states are bitter about the United States and NATO departing Afghanistan before the 
country is stable, they will not sit idly while the country falls into chaos.197  
Another area where the United States and China can find common ground is the 
Mes Aynak and Amu Darya projects. The United States and the international community 
need to pressure Beijing into upholding its contract obligations for infrastructure 
development. Chinese SOEs should not be allowed to renegotiate their way out of these 
commitments. The $10 billion worth of infrastructure development around Aynak, and 
the billions around Amu Darya, could provide the stimulus necessary to jump start the 
Afghan economy. 
While there are areas of collaboration in Afghanistan, there are also areas of 
concern that policy and decision makers should avoid. China will not be pressured into 
deploying troops to Afghanistan; pressuring Beijing to do so is counterproductive and a 
waste of effort. Beijing will decide to deploy troops to Afghanistan only under dire 
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circumstances, and even then deployment will be under the guise of international 
legitimacy through the UN and at the invitation of the government of Afghanistan.198 
Another area of concern is China’s developing role in Central Asia. President Xi Jinping 
recently traveled through Central Asia and signed billions of dollars’ worth of trade 
agreements on his way to the annual SCO forum. He has also stated the goal of 
developing a Silk Road economic belt, with Pakistan acting as the test case. It would be 
unwise for policy and decision makers to interfere with these efforts because they directly 
affect the future economic development and stability of Afghanistan. Central Asia is 
becoming more important to China’s energy security, so U.S. efforts in the region would 
be looked at with great suspicion and hostility.199  
The last area of concern is China’s relationship with Pakistan. While the Sino–
Pakistan alliance is healthy and vibrant, testing it is ill advised. China cannot be cajoled 
or pressured into exerting leverage over Pakistan. China values the relationship as a foil 
to India’s ambitions and will not jeopardize it to assist the United States. It is not 
apparent if China can pressure Pakistan to change its policy of strategic depth in 
Afghanistan. The relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan is unclear as well. While 
some link definitely exists because the Taliban leadership has safe haven there, as a 
proxy, it is unclear how much influence Pakistan has over the Taliban.  
Some see a future for Afghanistan in the strength of the ANSF, the government 
capacity U.S. and NATO forces have built, and the development of an Afghan economy. 
These trends may seem bright but they are overshadowed by the obstacles Afghanistan 
faces during this period of transition. The way forward in Afghanistan involves the best 
efforts of the Afghan government, the United States, China, and neighboring countries or 
the country will slide back into anarchy. Time has not run out on the experiment of nation 
building in Afghanistan, but the time to make a difference in Afghanistan’s future is now.  
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